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Environmental assessment within the process of regulatory review is recognized as the 
preferred means for carrying out the duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal rights 
in administrative decisions over proposed resource development. Recent evidence suggests 
that integrating the duty to consult into National Energy Board (NEB) proceedings and 
subsuming the law of Aboriginal consultation under principles of administrative justice have 
not advanced the goal of reconciliation. This article considers whether the statutory mandate 
of the National Energy Board requires it to have sufficient regard to Aboriginal rights in a 
manner consistent with the adjudication of constitutional issues in administrative law. The 
article argues, through an examination of the Board’s process and recent decisions of the 
Federal Court of Appeal, that there is good reason to revisit the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
jurisprudence on the role of administrative expertise in effecting reconciliation in the NEB 
context. In particular, it submits that both reconciliatory and administrative objectives would 
be better served if the NEB were to perform a formal consultative role with Aboriginal 
claimants in accordance with prescribed constitutional standards. This would help to ensure 
that administrative actors reach rights-compliant decisions in the first instance and provide 
a more reliable basis for judicial deference to tribunal findings regarding Aboriginal rights.
Une évaluation environnementale dans le cadre d’un examen réglementaire est réputée être 
le moyen préféré de s’acquitter du devoir de consulter les Autochtones et d’accommoder 
leurs droits lors de décisions administratives touchant les propositions de mise en valeur des 
richesses naturelles. Il a été récemment démontré qu’intégrer le devoir de consulter dans 
*  JD Candidate 2017, Osgoode Hall Law School. I would like to thank Professors Andrée 
Boiselle, Brian Slattery, Lorne Sossin, and Sari Graben as well as Mr. Anthony Knox for their 
helpful comments during the early stages of this article. All errors are my own.
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les procédures de l’Office national de l’énergie (ONE) et subsumer le devoir de consulter les 
Autochtones aux principes de la justice administrative n’a pas fait progresser le but de la 
réconciliation. Cet article se demande si le mandat statutaire de l’Office national de l’énergie 
l’oblige à prendre suffisamment en considération les droits autochtones d’une manière 
conforme au traitement des problèmes constitutionnels en droit administratif. Il fait valoir, à 
la lumière d’une analyse du processus de l’Office et de jugements récents de la Cour d’appel 
fédérale, qu’il existe de bonnes raisons de revoir la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du 
Canada sur la capacité de l’expertise administrative d’arriver à la réconciliation dans le 
contexte de l’ONE. Il propose en particulier que les objectifs réconciliatoires et administratifs 
seraient mieux atteints si l’ONE se donnait un rôle consultatif officiel conformément aux 
normes constitutionnelles en vigueur face aux demandeurs autochtones. Cela permettrait 
d’abord d’assurer que les arbitres administratifs émettent des jugements conformes aux 
droits, puis fournissent un fondement plus crédible à la retenue judiciaire par rapport aux 
conclusions des tribunaux relatives aux droits autochtones.
RECENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CLAIM THAT integrating the law of Aboriginal 
consultation with the process of administrative review has done little to advance 
the goal of reconciliation in the context of National Energy Board (NEB) 
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proceedings.1 This article examines the relationship between the constitutional 
duty to consult Aboriginal peoples and the NEB regulatory process. In particular, 
the article considers whether the NEB’s statutory mandate requires it to have 
regard to Aboriginal rights in a manner consistent with the adjudication of 
constitutional issues in administrative law.
It is now accepted practice to integrate Aboriginal consultation with the 
processes of environmental assessment (EA) and regulatory review (RR) that are 
delegated to expert administrative bodies. This strategy has become increasingly 
recognized as the preferred method for the Crown to carry out its duty to 
consult in the context of natural resource development. Where its regulatory 
responsibilities are triggered,2 the NEB, pursuant to the National Energy Board 
Act (NEBA) and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA), 
is required to take Aboriginal concerns about project impacts into account when 
deciding whether to recommend project approval to the designated statutory 
authority, or when acting as a final decision maker.3 The Crown generally views 
the NEB’s hearing process and EA report as the primary vehicles for conducting 
Aboriginal consultation.
1. See e.g. Sari Graben & Abbey Sinclair, “Tribunal Administration and the Duty to Consult: 
A Study of the National Energy Board” (2015) 65:4 UTLJ 382 and discussion below in 
Parts III and IV. This claim is further supported by the ongoing opposition many affected 
First Nations have shown in regards to recent NEB recommendations for approval of 
proposed oil and gas pipeline projects. The number of projects where the NEB process 
is claimed to provide for inadequate consultation continues to grow. See e.g. Shawn 
McCarthy & Kelly Cryderman, “NEB launches Energy East review as Quebec First Nations 
signal opposition,” The Globe and Mail (16 June 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.
com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/neb-launches-energy-
east-review-as-quebec-first-nations-signal-opposition/article30496458>; Kim Baird, 
“What’s missing from review of Trans Mountain pipeline expansion?” The Globe and 
Mail (21 August 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/
whats-missing-from-neb-review-of-trans-mountain-pipeline-expansion/article31483950>.
2. See National Energy Board Filing Manual, revised as of August 2016 (Calgary: NEB, 2004) 
at 1-1 [NEB Filing Manual]: “The National Energy Board’s (NEB or the Board) purpose 
is to promote safety, security, environmental protection and economic efficiency in the 
Canadian public interest through its regulation of pipelines, energy development and trade as 
mandated by Parliament.”
3. National Energy Board Act, RSC 1985, c N-7, ss 52, 58 [NEBA] (section 52 of the NEBA 
governs situations in which the NEB is tasked with making a recommendation related to 
project approval and section 58 governs situations in which the NEB is acting as the final 
decision maker); Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52, ss 5(1)
(c), 28 [CEAA] (project impacts on Aboriginal peoples are provided specific consideration 
under section 5(1)(c) of the CEAA).
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Since the Crown’s common law duty to consult is derived in part from 
section 35 of the Constitution, it represents the Crown’s obligation to recognize 
and affirm “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada.”4 The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has also interpreted Aboriginal 
consultation primarily as a “procedural duty,”5 in which principles of administrative 
law are thought to ensure adequate protection for Aboriginal rights.6 The context 
of Crown consultation, therefore, brings to light many complexities that reside at 
the intersection of administrative and constitutional law.
The duty’s integration with the process of regulatory review has generated 
significant uncertainty regarding an administrative tribunal’s authority to consider 
section 35 rights in exercising its delegated power as an independent regulator.7 
In particular, the NEB has been a frequent party to litigation concerning its 
jurisdiction over constitutional matters relating to Aboriginal consultation.8 
These cases typically raise three issues: (1) whether the NEB has the ability to 
determine the adequacy of Crown consultation; (2) whether the NEB has itself 
been delegated the power to engage in consultation or to fulfill the duty on behalf 
4. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11, 
s 35 [Constitution]. See Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 
at para 20, [2004] 3 SCR 511 [Haida Nation]. Chief Justice McLachlin discusses the Crown’s 
common law duty to consult:
Section 35 represents a promise of rights recognition, and “[i]t is always assumed that the 
Crown intends to fulfil its promises.” This promise is realized and sovereignty claims reconciled 
through the process of honourable negotiation. It is a corollary of s. 35 that the Crown act 
honourably in defining the rights it guarantees and in reconciling them with other rights 
and interests. This, in turn, implies a duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate 
[citations omitted].
 See also Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 at para 74, [2010] 
2 SCR 650 [Carrier Sekani] highlighting the Crown’s “constitutional obligation to consult.”
5. Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at para 78, [2014] 2 SCR 257 
[Tsilhqot’in Nation].
6. See e.g. Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 41. See accompanying text below in Part I.
7. See Janna Promislow, “Irreconcilable? The Duty to Consult and Administrative Decision 
Makers” (2013) 22:1 Const Forum Const 63; Kirk N Lambrecht, “Constitutional Law 
and the Alberta Energy Regulator” (2014) 23:2 Const Forum Const 33 [Lambrecht, 
“Constitutional”]; Graben & Sinclair, supra note 1; David J Mullan, “2015 Developments 
in Administrative Law Relevant to Energy Law and Regulation” (2016) 4:1 Energy Reg Q 
[Mullan, “Developments”].
8. See e.g. accompanying text and case law as cited in Part III, below. The NEB also maintains 
an active web-inventory of ongoing litigation. See National Energy Board, “Court Challenges 
to National Energy Board or Governor in Council Decisions,” online: <www.neb-one.gc.ca/
pplctnflng/crt/index-eng.html>.
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of the Crown; and (3) whether the Crown’s reliance on the NEB regulatory 
process can be a sufficient means of discharging the duty.
While the SCC has clarified that where authorized by statute, specialized 
tribunals can have the jurisdiction to evaluate the adequacy of consultation or 
engage in consultations,9 it will directly address the NEB’s mandate relating to 
the duty to consult, and to what extent the Crown is able to rely on the Board’s 
process to fulfill its duty in its pending judgments in Chippewas10 and Clyde River.11 
The Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) has held that when the Crown is not a party 
to hearing proceedings, the NEB’s jurisdiction does not extend to the question 
of the adequacy of consultation.12 However, FCA decisions are inconsistent with 
respect to the NEB’s power to engage in consultation on behalf of the Crown.13
The emerging scholarly literature examines the integration of Aboriginal 
consultation with EA and RR,14 specifically in the context of NEB proceedings.15 
These accounts vary with respect to the crucial issue of the Board’s jurisdiction 
over the Crown’s duty to consult. Some maintain that the NEB mandate excludes 
jurisdiction over matters relating to consultation, although the Crown may rely 
on the Board’s process to consider potential effects on Aboriginal rights as part of 
9. See Carrier Sekani, supra note 4 at paras 55-58.
10. Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc (30 November 2016), 36776 
(SCC) [Chippewas, SCC].
11. Hamlet of Clyde River, et al v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc (PGS), et al (30 November 2016), 
36692 (SCC) [Clyde River, SCC].
12. See Standing Buffalo Dakota First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2009 FCA 308 at paras 
25-44, [2010] 4 FCR 500 [Standing Buffalo]; Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v 
Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2015 FCA 222 at paras 22-24, 390 DLR (4th) 735 [Chippewas].
13. The FCA has held that the NEB does not have the power to undertake the fulfillment of any 
applicable Haida Nation duty of the Crown. See Standing Buffalo, ibid at para 34; Chippewas, 
ibid at paras 65-66. But see Hamlet of Clyde River, et al v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc (PGS), 
et al, 2015 FCA 179 at paras 44-46, 64, 474 NR 96 [Clyde River] (the FCA held the NEB 
did have a mandate to engage in consultation, although this did not entail formal delegation 
of the Crown’s duty).
14. See Kirk L Lambrecht, Aboriginal Consultation, Environmental Assessment, and Regulatory 
Review in Canada (Regina: University of Regina Press, 2013) [Lambrecht, Aboriginal 
Consultation]; Promislow, supra note 7; Keith B Bergner, “The Crown’s Duty to Consult 
and the Role of the Energy Regulator” (2014) 2 Energy Reg Q, online: < www.
energyregulationquarterly.ca/articles/the-crowns-duty-to-consult-and-the-role-of-the-
energy-regulator#sthash.5N4UvUIV.HaoCCO1s.dpbs>; Neil Craik, “Process and 
Reconciliation: Integrating the Duty to Consult with Environmental Assessment” (2016) 
53:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 632.
15. See especially Lambrecht, Aboriginal Consultation, ibid, ch 5; Bergner, ibid; Graben & 
Sinclair, supra note 1.
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its mandate to consider whether a project is in the public interest.16 Others argue 
the NEB’s mandate should include the power to determine the existence and 
adequacy of Crown consultation.17 In this article, I argue that the NEB’s mandate 
with respect to the duty to consult ought to vary in accordance with the specific 
statutory provision under which it is exercising its delegated powers. If the NEB 
has been delegated the statutory power of decision under its enabling legislation,18 
then its jurisdiction likely extends to a determination of the existence and 
adequacy of Crown consultation. In the majority of pipeline cases, however, the 
NEB does not have the power to decide anything with regard to project approval. 
The Harper government’s 2012 amendments removed this power in relation to 
the issuance of Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity for proposed 
pipelines under section 52 of the NEBA. Thus, in line with the SCC’s ruling in 
Carrier Sekani, section 52 demonstrates a clear legislative intent to deny the NEB 
any power of decision and, by extension, any power to decide the adequacy of 
Crown consultation.19
I then argue that the NEB must make its recommendations or decisions in 
line with the constitutional nature of the duty to consult, irrespective of statutory 
context, because the NEB plays a vital informational function with respect to 
the Crown’s duty to consult—a role which both the Crown and reviewing courts 
rely on to ensure adequate protection of section 35 rights. Working from within 
the judicially-prescribed “reconciliatory administrative framework,”20 I argue 
that heightened procedural controls on the NEB’s process are warranted to 
further the prospect for meaningful consultation and to provide a reliable basis 
for deference to administrative discretion in decisions that may adversely affect 
Aboriginal rights. A tribunal empowered to make findings regarding a project’s 
potential to adversely affect asserted Aboriginal rights ought to have an implied 
power to determine the scope and extent of the required consultation. From a 
practical standpoint, this would require the NEB to integrate a strength-of-claim 
assessment into its EA reports and its subsequent reasons for recommendation 
or decision. This enhanced process requirement does not necessarily mean that 
16. See Lambrecht, Aboriginal Consultation, ibid; Bergner, ibid.
17. See generally Graben & Sinclair, supra note 1.
18. See NEBA, supra note 3, s 58.
19. Carrier Sekani, supra note 4 at para 69.
20. The term “reconciliatory administrative law/framework” has not been explicitly invoked in 
related jurisprudence, although, as described in more detail in Part I, below, it is reasonable 
to suggest that this is an apt phrase to describe the approach courts have taken to the 
integration of the Crown’s duty to consult in the context of regulatory review of resource 
development. I wish to acknowledge Anthony Knox for introducing me to this concept.
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the Crown’s duty has been delegated to the NEB. Rather, it means only that 
the Board’s procedure with respect to Aboriginal issues must comply with the 
constitutional dimensions of the duty and thus enable the Crown to be adequately 
informed of the extent of its obligations.
I begin in Part I by briefly outlining the legal framework for the duty to 
consult and reviewing the jurisprudential alignment of the duty with principles 
of administrative law, including the role of tribunals in consultation. In Part II 
I summarize the integration of Crown consultation with EA and RR in general 
terms and examine the NEB’s current policy with respect to consultation in more 
detail. I then draw attention in Part III to the issue of the NEB’s jurisdiction 
and to two recent appeals heard at the SCC that considered the NEB’s role in 
discharging the Crown’s duty.21 In Part IV I argue that the NEB’s authority over 
consultation depends, in part, on whether it has been delegated the statutory 
power of decision, and moreover, that when exercising its EA mandate, the NEB 
should make its findings in accordance with the scope and extent of required 
consultation. Part V concludes.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DUTY 
TO CONSULT AND ACCOMMODATE
First expressed by Chief Justice McLachlin in Haida Nation, the Crown’s duty 
to consult (and, where appropriate, to accommodate) Aboriginal interests 
arises when all three of the following elements are satisfied: (1) the Crown has 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of a potential Aboriginal claim or right; 
(2) the Crown contemplates conduct; and (3) such conduct may adversely affect 
an Aboriginal right or claim.22 The duty is prospective and directed towards the 
consideration of unproven rights of Aboriginal claimants before a government 
decision is made that may adversely affect them.23 The nature or content of the 
Crown’s duty “varies with the circumstances” and lies on a “spectrum” informed 
by two factors: “the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right,” and 
21. Chippewas, supra note 12; Clyde River, supra note 13.
22. Carrier Sekani, supra note 4 at para 31.
23. Ibid at para 35. One must take care to recognize, particularly in the context of Aboriginal 
treaty rights, that although specific rights (e.g., hunting, fishing, trapping, and harvesting 
rights) are established in the treaty text, often the scope of those rights is not established, 
or interpreted only as to be asserted by the Aboriginal claimant. Consultation obligations also 
arise in relation to proven or settled rights, but are judicially considered under the test for 
justified infringement. See Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 5 at para 77.
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“the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title claimed.”24 
The operative question is always “what is required to maintain the honour of 
the Crown and to effect reconciliation between the Crown and the Aboriginal 
peoples with respect to the interests at stake.”25
The duty’s guiding precepts, the honour of the Crown and reconciliation, 
remain vaguely defined, though subsequent jurisprudence26 and academic 
commentary27 have helped to outline their conceptual boundaries. Generally 
speaking, the “essential legal framework”28 is meant to protect and facilitate the 
overarching project of reconciling the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the 
de facto sovereignty of the Crown.29 Through its legislative and executive action, 
the Crown is “bound by its honour to balance societal and Aboriginal interests”30 
and to effect compromise in service of reconciliation. This “requires that the 
Crown act with good faith to provide meaningful consultation appropriate to the 
circumstances.”31 Of course, what counts as “meaningful consultation” is often 
the very point at issue in litigation over the adequacy of consultation. However, 
Dwight G Newman, whose work regarding the duty to consult has found favour 
with the SCC,32 provides the following definition:
[m]eaningful consultation is … that which achieves the purpose of the doctrine. 
… to maintain honourable Crown conduct and to offer a proactive protection to 
Aboriginal and treaty rights such that in situations of uncertainty about the scope of 
24. Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 39.
25. Ibid at para 45.
26. See e.g. ibid at paras 32-33, 38 (Chief Justice McLachlin describes the duty as an ongoing 
constitutional process, and that Crown/Aboriginal reconciliation is neither “a final legal 
remedy in the usual sense” nor a “distant legalistic goal”). See also Beckman v Little Salmon/
Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at paras 40-43, 104-110, [2010] 3 SCR 103 [Little 
Salmon] (Justice Binnie writing for the majority, discussing the honour of the Crown as a 
constitutional principle).
27. On theories of legal reconciliation within the context of the duty to consult, see generally 
Kent McNeil, “Reconciliation and the Supreme Court: The Opposing Views of Chief 
Justices Lamer and McLachlin” (2003) 2:1 Indigenous LJ 1; Mark D Walters, “The Morality 
of Aboriginal Law” (2006) 31 Queen’s LJ 470; Dwight G Newman, “Reconciliation: Legal 
Conception(s) and Faces of Justice” in John D Whyte, ed, Moving Toward Justice: Legal 
Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2008) 80.
28. Little Salmon, supra note 26 at para 69.
29. Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 32.
30. Ibid at para 45.
31. Ibid at para 41.
32. See e.g. Carrier Sekani, supra note 4 at paras 38, 41, 46; Little Salmon, supra note 
26 at para 103.
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Aboriginal rights and treaty rights, there is discussion of that uncertainty in advance 
of a government decision that may adversely impact them.33
It suffices for present purposes to note two procedural obligations that are 
contained within Newman’s definition: (1) meaningful consultation requires 
discussion of the uncertainty about the scope of the claimed Aboriginal right; 
and (2) discussion about the scope of the claimed right must occur in advance of 
a decision that may adversely impact it.
Respected scholars have written that the legal duty of consultation, and where 
appropriate, accommodation, represents an attempt by the courts to shift the 
process of recognizing Aboriginal rights away from litigation to one focused on 
negotiation.34 This dialogical form of governance,35 or generative constitutional 
order36 emphasizes the active participation of Indigenous peoples in the 
identification of their rights in modern form.37 There is, however, considerable 
uncertainty with respect to when a substantive duty of accommodation may arise, 
which would oblige the Crown to modify its position.38 Importantly, courts have 
been clear that the process of negotiation does not give Aboriginal groups a veto 
over the regulatory approval process.39 In order to fulfill their duty, governments 
are not required to reach agreement with Aboriginal claimants, but rather to 
effect a reasonable balance between conflicting interests.40
Significant opportunity remains to explore the legal complexity surrounding 
the duty to consult’s theoretical underpinnings and its practical application. The 
foregoing summary is only intended to lay a foundation for subsequent analysis 
33. Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich, 2014) at 86-87.
34. See e.g. Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 SCLR 
433; James [Sa’ke’j] Youngblood Henderson, “Dialogical Governance: A Mechanism of 
Constitutional Governance” (2009) 72 Sask L Rev 29; Newman, ibid at 27-33.
35. See Henderson, ibid.
36. See Slattery, supra note 34 at 434, 440.
37. Ibid at 436. For example, in the context of resource development, consultation is intended 
to facilitate the negotiation of revenue sharing or impact benefit agreements between affected 
Indigenous communities and the private sector. See also Newman, supra note 33 at 32-33.
38. See Verónica Potes, “The Duty to Accommodate Aboriginal Peoples Rights: Substantive 
Consultation?” (2006) 17:1 J Envtl L & Prac 27 at 38-45; Lorne Sossin, “The Duty to 
Consult and Accommodate: Procedural Justice as Aboriginal Rights” (2010) 23 CJALP 93. 
Both articles argue that the duty to consult and accommodate involves not just a procedural 
guarantee, but also, importantly, a substantive constraint where it is also necessary to show 
that the government’s substantive position has been modified as a result of the duty. See also 
discussion in Newman, supra note 33 at 103-112.
39. See Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 48; Little Salmon, supra note 26 at para 14.
40. See Haida Nation, ibid at para 49.
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regarding the integration of the doctrine with administrative law principles and 
the process of regulatory review conducted by the NEB.
A. RECONCILIATORY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—THE JURISPRUDENTIAL 
FRAMEWORK
This article is not the first to analyze the judicial alignment of the duty to 
consult with principles of administrative law.41 However, since the NEB fulfills 
its mandate, both generally and with respect to Aboriginal rights, within the 
confines of administrative review, it is important to underscore how the Court has 
applied familiar legal principles to the unique context of the duty to consult and 
accommodate. Since the Chief Justice stated in Haida Nation that in discharging 
the duty, “regard may be had to the procedural safeguards of natural justice 
mandated by administrative law,”42 both courts and academic commentators 
have grappled with understanding the nature of administrative decision making 
when constrained by the constitutional obligation of consultation.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s reference to administrative law in Haida Nation 
followed a line of jurisprudence that found principles of administrative justice 
applicable to questions of section 35 rights and the duty to consult.43 This finding 
was later affirmed in Little Salmon, in which Justice Binnie stated unequivocally 
for the majority of the Court that “Administrative law is flexible enough to give 
41. For extended discussion on the application of administrative law to the duty to consult and 
accommodate and “the procedural approach,” to the duty specifically, see Thomas Isaac & 
Anthony Knox, “The Crown’s Duty to Consult Aboriginal People,” (2003) 41:1 Atla L Rev 
49; Anthony Knox & Thomas Isaac, “Judicial Deference and the Significance of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s Decisions in Haida and Taku River” (2006) 64 Advocate 487 [Knox & 
Isaac]; Potes, supra note 38 at 33-38; Sossin, supra note 38; David Mullan, “The Supreme 
Court and the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples: A Lifting of the Fog?” (2011) 24 CLAJP 
233 [Mullan, “Fog”]. See also Nigel Bankes, “Who decides if the Crown has met its duty 
to consult and accommodate?” (6 December 2012), online: <www.ablawg.ca/2012/09/06/
who-decides-if-the-crown-has-met-its-duty-to-consult-and-accommodate>; Promislow, supra 
note 7; Janna Promislow & Lorne Sossin, “In Search of Aboriginal Administrative Law” 
in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2d ed (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 2013) 449 [Promislow & Sossin]; Lambrecht, “Constitutional,” supra 
note 7; Lambrecht, Aboriginal Consultation, supra note 14; Graben & Sinclair, supra note 1.
42. Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 41.
43. See Paul v British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), 2003 SCC 55, [2003] 2 
SCR 585 [Paul].
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full weight to the constitutional interests of the First Nation.”44 Since the process of 
EA and RR is intended primarily as a formal device to both inform and constrain 
the exercise of Crown discretion, the integration of the duty with RR provides 
for a natural extension of the tools and procedural safeguards of administrative 
law to the constitutional objective of protecting section 35 rights. The Court thus 
appears confident that the Crown’s constitutional duty to consult, and where 
appropriate accommodate, can be effectively met through a process that adheres 
to such safeguards, in particular the common law duty of procedural fairness.45
It is therefore worth understanding in broad terms how administrative law 
principles provide an adjudicative framework for duty-to-consult litigation. 
I examine this framework briefly in four sections: contextual analysis, procedure, 
standard of review, and tribunal jurisdiction over consultation. These categories 
are not intended as an exhaustive means to analyze the alignment of administrative 
law and the law of Aboriginal consultation,46 although they inform the principal 
issues in recent SCC appeals involving Aboriginal consultation and the NEB 
process. Namely, that a determination with respect to a tribunal’s jurisdiction, 
and what procedural and substantive requirements Aboriginal claimants are due, 
will vary according to context, and furthermore, that factual findings made by 
tribunals under an EA mandate that bear on Aboriginal rights will typically be 
afforded considerable judicial deference.47
1. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
The duty to consult and administrative law can be said to share a common 
logic—one driven by contextual inquiry to ensure fair procedure and the exercise 
of reasonable discretion when such discretion affects the rights of those impacted 
by Crown actions. The contextual and flexible nature of administrative law is a 
primary factor driving the integration of the duty with the process of EA and RR. 
As the duty, EA, and RR are highly contextual, fact driven endeavours. The entire 
44. Little Salmon, supra note 26 at para 47. For a recent example at the FCA expressing 
the alignment of the duty to consult with administrative law see Justice Stratas in 
Canada (Attorney General) v Long Plain First Nation, 2015 FCA 177 at para 107, 
388 DLR (4th) 209.
45. See supra note 41.
46. Additional areas of administrative law relevant to the duty to consult not addressed in this 
article include consideration of remedies and tribunal impartiality. See e.g. Kent Roach, 
Constitutional Remedies in Canada (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2016) (loose-leaf revision 
27), ch 15 at 35-46 (in respect of remedies); Promislow & Sossin, supra note 41 (where the 
authors discuss issues relating to impartiality).
47. See discussion in Part I(A)(3), below, regarding standard of review.
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practice of EA is critically dependant on the specific biophysical properties and 
technical details of a proposed development. When this fact is coupled with the 
many variants of statutory bodies charged with regulatory review—each adhering 
to specific provisions or terms of reference that define its mandate for a given 
project—contextual inquiry becomes a necessity. Indeed, as I will argue, the 
NEB mandate relating to the Crown’s duty to consult is critically dependent on 
the particular provision under which it is exercising its delegated powers.
Context also drives the inquiry into the substantive elements of the duty 
itself: Its triggering conditions, the spectrum analysis that determines its content, 
and the circumstances that give rise to potential accommodation measures. The 
preliminary assessment of the strength of the Aboriginal claim and the seriousness 
of the potential adverse impact on the claimed right will typically vary on a 
case-by-case basis. In turn, what constitutes “meaningful consultation” will be a 
discrete function of the factual and legal context.
Moreover, the duty to consult is not restricted to asserted rights, but also 
arises under conditions of established title, treaty rights, and other formal 
agreements.48 As Kirk Lambrecht remarks, “Contextual analysis is brilliant in its 
conception, for it allows the law to be sufficiently flexible to fit the circumstances 
of each particular case. This is especially significant given the nuance inherent 
to appreciation of Aboriginal rights and Treaty rights.”49 The procedural and 
remedial flexibility of administrative law makes it well suited to deal with 
the legal and factual complexity that arises when Aboriginal consultation is 
integrated with the process of regulatory review. In this setting, courts will seek 
to rely on the specialized knowledge of administrative decision makers to ensure 
adequate protection of rights in the application of technical expertise to specific 
consultation issues.
2. PROCEDURE
As Janna Promislow and Lorne Sossin have shown, both the duty to consult and 
accommodate and the duty of procedural fairness share a common analytical 
structure that involves two steps: threshold and content.50 Both duties are easily 
triggered51 and the content of their procedural requirements is similar. “While 
precise requirements will vary with the circumstances,” in many cases, the duty 
48. For an in-depth examination of the duty to consult in its various contextual manifestations, 
see Newman, supra note 33.
49. Aboriginal Consultation, supra note 14 at 113.
50. Supra note 41 at 469-74.
51. See discussion in Newman, supra note 33 at 90.
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to consult mandates procedural obligations similar to those owed under a duty of 
fairness, for example notice and disclosure, an opportunity to make submissions, 
and provision of written reasons.52 There are, however, some noteworthy 
differences.53 For example, whereas Baker identified five factors that determine 
the content of the common law duty of procedural fairness,54 only two factors 
determine the content of the duty to consult and accommodate.55 Although the 
seriousness of the impact of the decision on the claimant’s rights is a factor under 
Baker, an assessment of the strength of the claim that underlies the basis of the 
asserted right to be consulted is not. Thus, a strength-of-claim analysis is unique 
to the procedural demands of the duty to consult and serves as one of two factors 
determining the level of consultation required.56
Another difference is that the duty to consult includes, where appropriate, 
a substantive duty to accommodate.57 As noted above, a discussion of when 
the procedural dimensions of consultation blend into substantive rights of 
accommodation is beyond the scope of this article.58 However, it suffices for my 
purposes to note that there is judicial reluctance to order specific accommodation 
measures.59 With respect to accommodation, the SCC seems content to embrace 
what some have termed the “conservative view” of the duty to consult. Promislow 
and Sossin explain that under this view:
52. See Haida Nation, supra note 4 at paras 43-44.
53. See Mullan, “Fog,” supra note 41 at 241-45. It is worth noting that the SCC has also 
indicated that “formal participation in the decision-making process” might be a procedural 
requirement in certain circumstances, although the Court did not elaborate on the meaning 
or extent of “participation.” See Haida Nation, ibid at para 44.
54. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at paras 23-27, 
174 DLR (4th) 193.
55. See accompanying text in Part I of this article, above, for factors in spectrum analysis.
56. See Haida Nation, supra note 4 paras at 43-44. At the other end of the spectrum 
lie cases where a strong prima facie case for the claim is established, the right and 
potential infringement is of high significance to the Aboriginal peoples, and the risk of 
non-compensable damage is high. In such cases deep consultation, aimed at finding a 
satisfactory interim solution, may be required. While precise requirements will vary with the 
circumstances, the consultation required at this stage may entail the opportunity to make 
submissions for consideration, formal participation in the decision-making process, and 
provision of written reasons to show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and to reveal 
the impact they had on the decision.
57. Ibid at paras 47-51.
58. See discussion contained in sources cited in supra note 38.
59. Promislow & Sossin, supra note 41 at 474.
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reconciliation is achieved by ensuring that Aboriginal interests are considered within 
existing decision-making structures and that attention is paid to working out the 
balance between Aboriginal concerns, third-party interests, and the broader public 
interests within those decision processes.60
This perspective is consistent with the Court’s holding that consultation does 
not entail a duty to agree and that accommodation is directed toward “seeking 
compromise in an attempt to harmonize conflicting interests.”61 In the Court’s 
view, the duty appears to reflect more of “a mechanism to integrate Aboriginal 
rights within existing administrative structures.”62 It should be noted, however, 
that at the time of writing, the Canadian government had recently announced 
its support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People (UNDRIP), which includes the principle of Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent (FPIC).63 The degree to which the government’s implementation 
of FPIC will translate into heightened procedural and substantive rights for 
Aboriginal peoples under the duty to consult—in cases where prospective rights 
are asserted but not yet legally defined—remains to be seen.64 Initial policy 
60. Ibid at 481. This is in contrast to those who view the duty as one oriented towards changing 
state structures to preserve “Aboriginal interests in advance of … more complete resolutions 
of Aboriginal claims” (ibid at 480). See also supra note 53.
61. Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 49.
62. Promislow & Sossin, supra note 41 at 481 [emphasis added].
63. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007, 61/295 
arts 10-11, 19, 28-29. See The Honourable Carolyn Bennett, Minister of Indigenous 
and Northern Affairs, (Speech delivered at the United Nations Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues, New York, 10 May 2016), online: <news.gc.ca/web/article-en.
do?nid=1064009&tp=970>.
64. Implementing FPIC in the context of Aboriginal consultation where rights are asserted but 
not yet established raises many complex questions. See e.g. Lorraine Land, “Who’s afraid of 
the Big Bad FPIC? The evolving integration of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples into Canadian law and policy,” Northern Public Affairs 4:2 (May 2016) 42, 
online: <www.northernpublicaffairs.ca>.
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language, however, appears to limit the application of FPIC to modern treaty 
and self-government agreements.65
3. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Guided by general principles of administrative law, the Chief Justice in Haida 
Nation set out a familiar framework for judicial review of government conduct 
when challenged on the basis of allegations that the Crown failed to adequately 
discharge its duty to consult.66 Some commentators have noted, correctly in my 
view, that Haida Nation effectively “remove[s] all notion of the Doctrine existing 
in some sui generis world devoid of guidance from the general common law” and 
“provides a touchstone to the judiciary for testing any particular implementation 
65. See supra note 63. In her speech, Minister Bennett does not reference the duty to consult, 
observing only that “Canada believes that our constitutional obligations serve to fulfil all 
of the principles of the declaration, including ‘free, prior and informed consent’. We see 
modern treaties and self-government agreements as the ultimate expression of free, prior and 
informed consent among partners.” Recent developments have brought further uncertainty 
in respect of Canada’s commitment to implementing UNDRIP, with the Minister of Justice 
stating that the declaration is “unworkable” as Canadian law. See John Invison, “First Nations 
hear hard truth that UN indigenous rights declaration is ‘unworkable’ as law,” National Post 
(14 July 2016), online: <news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/john-ivison-first-nations-
hear-hard-truth-that-un-rights-declaration-unworkable-as-law>. One possible option for 
implementing FPIC in the context of asserted rights, however, may be to calibrate the degree 
of formal participation in the decision-making process to the strength of claim assessment. 
Though many questions remain, it may be appropriate to interpret “participation” as 
implying a degree of decision-making authority where the legal claim to Aboriginal title or 
treaty rights is particularly strong.
66. See Haida Nation, supra note 4 at paras 61-62:
The existence or extent of the duty to consult or accommodate is a legal question in the 
sense that it defines a legal duty. However, it is typically premised on an assessment of the 
facts. It follows that a degree of deference to the findings of fact of the initial adjudicator may 
be appropriate. The need for deference and its degree will depend on the nature of the question 
the tribunal was addressing and the extent to which the facts were within the expertise of the 
tribunal. … Absent error on legal issues, the tribunal may be in a better position to evaluate the 
issue than the reviewing court, and some degree of deference may be required. In such a case, 
the standard of review is likely to be reasonableness. To the extent that the issue is one of pure 
law, and can be isolated from the issues of fact, the standard is correctness. However, where the 
two are inextricably entwined, the standard will likely be reasonableness.
 The process itself would likely fall to be examined on a standard of reasonableness. Perfect 
satisfaction is not required; the question is whether the regulatory scheme or government 
action “viewed as a whole, accommodates the collective aboriginal right in question”.
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of the Doctrine.”67 Though decided before Dunsmuir,68 this framework is 
consistent with current interpretation of judicial review, which places significant 
emphasis on deference to administrative discretion when determinations are made 
by decision makers acting within the context of their own legislative scheme and 
largely entail questions of fact or mixed fact and law.69
While questions relating to the existence of the duty are to be reviewed on a 
standard of correctness,70 in the context of NEB decisions and other expert review 
panels under federal jurisdiction a reasonableness standard has been applied to 
review of both the adequacy and process of consultation.71 Questions concerning 
a tribunal’s jurisdiction over consultation are, however, uniformly considered 
questions of law reviewable on the standard of correctness.72
There is some inconsistency in the SCC’s approach in Haida Nation and its 
later ruling in Little Salmon, where Justice Binnie found that the question of the 
adequacy of consultation should be reviewed on a correctness standard.73 Lower 
courts have, however, preferred to follow Haida Nation and apply a reasonableness 
standard to this question, due largely to the factual nature of the inquiry74 and 
its close connection to the function assigned to the tribunal under its enabling 
legislation.75 This interpretation aligns further with cases where considerable 
67. Knox & Issac, supra note 41 at 491.
68. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir].
69. Ibid at para 54.
70. See Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 61; Clyde River, supra note 13 at para 34.
71. See Brokenhead Ojibway First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 484 at para 
18, [2009] 3 CNLR 36 [Brokenhead]; Council of the Innu of Ekuanitshit v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2014 FCA 189 at paras 40-41, 376 DLR (4th) 348 [Innu]; Clyde River, supra 
note 13 at para 34.
72. Ibid; Carrier Sekani, supra note 4 at para 67.
73. Although, Justice Binnie went on to observe that the director’s decision to approve the 
project in question should be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness. See Little Salmon, 
supra note 26 at para 48:
In exercising his discretion under the Yukon  Lands Act  and the  Territorial Lands (Yukon) 
Act, the Director was required to respect legal and constitutional limits.  In establishing 
those limits no deference is owed to the Director.  The standard of review in that respect, 
including the adequacy of the consultation, is correctness. A decision maker who proceeds 
on the basis of inadequate consultation errs in law. Within the limits established by the law 
and the Constitution, however, the Director’s decision should be reviewed on a standard of 
reasonableness.
74. See e.g. Neskonlith Indian Band v Salmon Arm (City), 2012 BCCA 379 at para 60, 37 BCLR 
(5th) 49 (where Justice Newbury distinguishes the applicable standard on this basis).
75. See Clyde River, supra note 13 at para 36.
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deference is accorded to administrative expertise when making determinations 
on questions of mixed fact and law.76
Some have also argued that the constitutional dimension of the duty to 
consult merits review of consultation adequacy according to a correctness 
standard, suggesting that “an overly deferential treatment of Crown consultation 
decisions may discourage further Crown action to implement the duty, and 
thus hinder the protection of the unproven Aboriginal rights the duty was 
intended to protect.”77 However, in Doré, the SCC signaled the appropriateness 
of reasonableness review for administrative decisions where constitutional rights 
have been claimed.78 There thus appears to be a strong argument that judicial 
review of Crown consultation tends to conform broadly to general principles 
of standard of review analysis, including the predominant application of a 
reasonableness standard to energy regulators generally.79
Standard-of-review analysis in duty-to-consult litigation has tended to 
reinforce the notion that the project of reconciliation is to be undertaken primarily 
by the executive and legislative branches of government working collaboratively 
with Aboriginal peoples. The judiciary has tried to limit itself to a supporting 
role and has expressed an intention to avoid deciding substantive outcomes, 
instead focusing on the task of “regulating the mischief of Crown dishonour 
in Aboriginal contexts.”80 This point underscores the importance of finding a 
reliable basis for deference to administrative decisions that may adversely impact 
Aboriginal rights. Put concisely, if courts are generally going to defer to tribunal 
determinations that bear on asserted Aboriginal rights, then those findings 
ought to be made in accordance with the doctrine of consultation as judicially 
prescribed, a point developed further in Part IV.
4. ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN CONSULTATION
The SCC first considered the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to adjudicate 
Aboriginal rights in Paul, where it recognized that as part of a unitary system of 
76. See Dunsmuir, supra note 68 at para 53.
77. See Promislow & Sossin, supra note 41 at 479. See generally Timothy Huyer, “Honour of the 
Crown: The New Approach to Crown-Aboriginal Reconciliation” (2006) 21 Windsor Rev 
Legal Soc Issues 33.
78. See Doré v Barreau du Quebec, 2012 SCC 12 at paras 44-58, [2012] 1 SCR 395.
79. See generally Mullan, “Developments,” supra note 7.
80. Jamie Dickson, “The Honour of the Crown: Making Sense of Crown Liability Doctrine in 
Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada” (LLM Thesis, University of Saskatchewan Faculty 
of Law, 2014) at 18, online: <ecommons.usask.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10388/
ETD-2014-01-1379/DICKSON-THESIS.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y>.
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justice, administrative tribunals and decision makers are well placed to address 
Aboriginal issues.81 In Carrier Sekani, the SCC provided its only guidance 
regarding the role of an administrative tribunal in specific relation to the Crown’s 
duty to consult.82 While the SCC has not explicitly invoked the term “Haida 
analysis,” this term has been employed in litigation at the FCA to summarize the 
jurisdictional inquiry a court or tribunal may be required to undertake in relation 
to the duty to consult. It consists of three questions: (1) whether a duty to consult 
was owed; (2) the extent and scope of that duty; and (3) whether the Crown has 
discharged its duty on the appropriate standard.83
In Carrier Sekani the SCC found that the British Columbia Utilities 
Commission (BCUC) had correctly asserted its jurisdiction to consider the 
adequacy of Crown consultation,84 while also concluding that the BCUC lacked 
the delegated authority to engage in consultation. The SCC went on to align 
Carrier Sekani with established rules for tribunal jurisdiction over constitutional 
issues by setting out four guiding principles:85
1.  The duty on a tribunal to consider consultation and the scope of that inquiry 
depends on the mandate conferred by the legislation that creates the tribunal.
2.  A legislature is free to delegate to a tribunal the Crown’s duty to consult.
3.  A legislature is also free to confine a tribunal’s power to determinations of 
whether adequate consultation has taken place, as a condition of its statutory 
decision-making process.
4.  Both the powers of the tribunal to consider questions of law and the remedial 
powers granted it by the legislature are relevant to determining whether a 
particular tribunal has a duty to consult, a duty to consider consultation, or no 
duty at all.
In short, a tribunal’s jurisdiction with respect to Aboriginal consultation is a 
function of the powers the legislature intended to delegate to that particular 
tribunal. As a condition of its statutory decision-making process, a tribunal may 
serve one of four roles in the consultation process. It may be delegated the power 
to (1) engage in consultation; (2) evaluate the adequacy of consultation; (3) fulfill 
both these roles; or it may (4) fulfill neither of them. Where legislation does not 
81. See Paul, supra note 43 at paras 37-38.
82. See Carrier Sekani, supra note 4.
83. See Chippewas, supra note 12 at para 81.
84. Ibid at para 72.
85. Ibid at paras 55-58.
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explicitly address the duty to consult,86 any role the tribunal has must therefore 
be implicit. As guidance for discerning implied legislative intent, the SCC drew a 
crucial distinction between a constitutional question and a constitutional process, 
and clearly situated the issue of a tribunal’s power to engage in consultation 
in the latter category.87 In the Court’s view, a tribunal’s power to engage in a 
constitutional process depends upon the explicit or implicit conferral of such a 
power in the tribunal’s enabling legislation. However, with regard to the issue 
of the existence or adequacy of consultation—interpreted as a constitutional 
question—a tribunal that has statutory authority to decide questions of law 
is presumed to have jurisdiction over constitutional questions unless that 
jurisdiction is specifically removed by statute.88
The SCC also seems to suggest that determination of an implied legislative 
intent to confer a Haida duty on a tribunal to engage in consultation may be 
assisted through an inquiry into the tribunal’s remedial powers. What remedial 
powers would support such an implication would be a contextual matter, but 
the Court offers little guidance on this subject. Lastly, if a tribunal has the power 
to determine the adequacy of consultation but not to enter into consultations 
itself, Carrier Sekani suggests that the tribunal should exercise whatever remedial 
powers it has been conferred so as “to protect Aboriginal rights and interests and 
to promote the reconciliation of interests called for in Haida Nation.”89
As explained in Part III below, the FCA has applied the SCC’s jurisprudence 
on tribunal jurisdiction in duty to consult litigation restrictively, especially in the 
86. See e.g., NEBA, supra note 3 (enacted in 1985, this statute makes no reference to 
Aboriginal consultation).
87. See the SCC’s oft-cited passage in Carrier Sekani, supra note 4 at para 60:
A tribunal has only those powers that are expressly or implicitly conferred on it by 
statute. In order for a tribunal to have the power to enter into interim resource consultations 
with a First Nation, pending the final settlement of claims, the tribunal must be expressly or 
impliedly authorized to do so. The power to engage in consultation itself, as distinct from the 
jurisdiction to determine whether a duty to consult exists, cannot be inferred from the mere 
power to consider questions of law. Consultation itself is not a question of law; it is a distinct 
and often complex constitutional process and, in certain circumstances, a right involving 
facts, law, policy, and compromise. The tribunal seeking to engage in consultation itself must 
therefore possess remedial powers necessary to do what it is asked to do in connection with the 
consultation. The remedial powers of a tribunal will depend on that tribunal’s enabling statute, 
and will require discerning the legislative intent.
88. See Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Martin, 2003 SCC 54 at para 36, 
[2003] 2 SCR 504; Paul, supra note 43 at para 39; R v Conway, 2010 SCC 22 at para 77, 
[2010] 1 SCR 765.
89. Carrier Sekani, supra note 4 at para 61.
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context of NEB proceedings to which the Crown is not a party. Before pursuing 
this subject in greater detail through an examination of the NEB’s consultation 
policy and its mandate as interpreted by recent FCA decisions, it is worth briefly 
reviewing the integration of Aboriginal consultation with the process of EA and 
RR in general terms.
II. INTEGRATING THE DUTY TO CONSULT WITH THE NEB 
REGULATORY PROCESS
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND 
ABORIGINAL CONSULTATION
[R]obust environmental assessment and regulatory review of projects comprise 
a reasonable process for gathering and assessing information on the significance 
of project impacts on Aboriginal peoples. Integration will foster potential for 
reconciliation in regard to a project to be served efficiently by project proponents, 
tribunals, the Crown, the courts, and Aboriginal peoples.90
In the companion case to Haida Nation, the SCC found in Taku River that 
the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate could be fulfilled within the 
regulatory process of EA.91 This holding has been affirmed in subsequent 
decisions of the SCC and the federal courts.92 In reference to Taku River, Justice 
Binnie, writing for the majority of the Court in Little Salmon, observed that a 
“forum created for other purposes may nevertheless satisfy the duty to consult 
if in substance an appropriate level of consultation is provided.”93 Both Taku River 
and Little Salmon involved regulatory processes overseen by Crown agencies,94 
90. Lambrecht, Aboriginal Consultation, supra note 14 at 110 (as cited by Justice Dawson in 
Clyde River, supra note 13 at para 69).
91. Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia, 2004 SCC 74 at para 40, [2004] 3 
SCR 550 [Taku River] (the legislation governing the EA set out a process that required 
consultation with Aboriginal peoples affected by the project).
92. See e.g. SCC decisions Little Salmon, supra note 26 at para 39; Quebec (Attorney General) 
v Moses, 2010 SCC 17 at para 45, [2010] 1 SCR 557 and federal court decisions 
Brokenhead, supra note 71 at paras 25; Innu, supra note 71 at para 99; Clyde River, supra 
note 13 at para 44.
93. Little Salmon, supra note 26 at para 39 [emphasis in original].
94. In Taku River, consultation was undertaken by the BC Environmental Assessment Office 
in the course of a provincial EA requiring Ministerial approval in which the provincial and 
federal governments was invited to participate, including the government of BC (see Taku 
River, supra note 91 at para 7). Little Salmon involved an application submitted by a Yukon 
resident to the Yukon government’s Land Application Review Committee.
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as opposed to decision processes undertaken by an independent, quasi-judicial 
tribunal such as the NEB, in which the Crown is not typically a party.
In the context of major resource extraction projects that engage federal 
jurisdiction under the NEBA or the CEAA, the applicable legislation specifically 
requires consideration of impacts on Aboriginal peoples.95 In the event of 
overlapping federal and provincial jurisdiction, the CEAA also provides for the 
creation of a joint review panel (JRP) to carry out the EA process and assess 
the significance of adverse effects on Aboriginal communities.96 The federal 
Crown’s policy is to integrate Aboriginal consultation “into the environmental 
assessment and regulatory process to the greatest extent possible.”97 Provincial 
ministries have similar policies where an EA is triggered for project evaluation.98 
The federal government has also developed Aboriginal Consultation Frameworks 
that describe how to conduct consultation in complex regulatory proceedings 
involving such delegated panels.99 Importantly, the federal government is 
currently involved in an extensive review of its environmental and regulatory 
95. CEAA, supra note 3, s 5(1)(c):
With respect to aboriginal peoples, an effect occurring in Canada of any change that may be 
caused to the environment on
(i) health and socio-economic conditions,
(ii) physical and cultural heritage,
(iii) the current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes, or
(iv)  any structure, site or thing that is of historical, archaeological, paleontological or 
architectural significance.
96. Ibid, ss 38, 40. The JRP process, established pursuant to a complex legislative scheme that 
combines elements of both the CEAA and the NEBA, is a distinct and isolated process from 
the operating process under the CEA Agency. This scheme was considered recently by the 
FCA in Gitxaala Nation v Canada, 2016 FCA 187, 485 NR 258 [Gitxaala Nation] and is 
discussed further below in Part VI of the article.
97. Canada, Minister of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
Canada, Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation – Updated Guidelines for Federal 
Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2011) at 25 [Federal 
Consultation Policy].
98. See e.g. British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office, Guide to Involving Proponents 
when Consulting First Nations in the Environmental Assessment Process, (BC Environment 
Assessment Office, December 2013); Alberta Energy Regulator & Aboriginal Consultation 
Office, Joint Operating Procedures for First Nations Consultation on Energy Resource 
Activities (Procedures), (Alberta Energy Regulator, 10 June 2015).
99. See e.g. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Aboriginal Consultation Framework 
for the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project,” online: <www.ceaa- acee.gc.ca/050/
documents/40861/40861E.pdf>.
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processes, with a particular emphasis on Indigenous engagement in EA and 
“modernization” of the NEB.100
There is of course a strong pragmatic argument for integrating Aboriginal 
consultation with EA, as information and analysis relevant to the environmental 
effects of a proposed development will be required to assess the impacts of 
the development on Aboriginal rights.101 Thus, efficiency and the reduction 
of duplicative regulatory processes provide a good rationale for integration.102 
A further emphasis is placed on the benefits of early Crown engagement. While 
consultation activities should occur across all phases of the project approval 
process, facilitating Aboriginal involvement in the early planning stages of 
development through EA can serve to strengthen relationships between the 
various parties and “foster potential for reconciliation.”103
Neil Craik has recently argued that integrating the duty to consult with EA 
could foster reconciliation if certain elements in the process that better align 
with the purpose of the duty were institutionalized.104 For example, he highlights 
the potential for sustainability assessment,105 consideration of alternatives,106 
cumulative impacts assessment,107 and Aboriginal participation in strategic EA108 
to promote the inclusion of Aboriginal values. According to Craik, this approach 
100. See Government of Canada, “Review of Environmental and Regulatory Processes,” online: 
<www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmental-reviews.
html>; Government of Canada, “National Energy Board Modernization,” online: <www.
canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmental-reviews/
national-energy-board-modernization.html>.
101. For a more detailed look at the process of integrating consultation with EA and RR see 
Lambrecht, Aboriginal Consultation, supra note 14; Craik, supra note 14.
102. Lambrecht, ibid at 43-45.
103. Ibid at 110.
104. See Craik, supra note 14.
105. See e.g. Robert B Gibson, Meinhard Doelle, & A John Sinclair, “Fulfilling the Promise: 
Basic Components of Next Generation Environmental Assessment” (2016) 29 J 
Envtl L & Prac 257.
106. Assessment of alternatives was a factor to be considered under the now repealed Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act. See SC 1992, c 37, s 16(e), as repealed by 2012, c 19, 
s 66 [CEAA, 1992].
107. The CEAA expressly provides for “the study of cumulative effects of physical activities in a 
region and the consideration of those study results in environmental assessments.” See CEAA, 
supra note 3, ss 4(1)(i), 73-74.
108. Carrier Sekani affirms the principle that the duty to consult can be engaged at an early, 
strategic stage of decision making: “the duty to consult extends to ‘strategic, higher level 
decisions’ that may have an impact on Aboriginal claims and rights.” See supra note 4 at para 
44. See also Robert B Gibson et al, “Strengthening Strategic Environmental Assessment in 
Canada: An Evaluation of Three Basic Options” (2010) 20:3 J Envtl L & Prac 175.
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holds promise for the “transformational” potential of EA to implement the duty 
to consult. In the context of sustainability assessment, he states:
While reconciliation itself is often described in oppositional terms (i.e., as balancing 
Aboriginal interests with those of non-Aboriginals), the critical opportunity that the 
integrative orientation of sustainability assessment provides is the opportunity for 
the Crown and Aboriginal groups to deliberate over a shared development vision.109
Including evaluative criteria, which Indigenous people would be more likely to 
approve in the scope of EA, and justifying government decisions in light of those 
criteria, could help to advance notions of shared understanding with an aim of 
reconciliation. However, since the Crown’s discretionary power remains operative 
in determining the significance and weight of the selected criteria in the process 
of justifying its decision, one is again left with the task of balancing competing 
interests and reaching compromise.110 To what extent Craik’s approach would lead 
to greater protection for Aboriginal rights is therefore an uncertain proposition, 
but one deserving of serious consideration.
It is important to recognize that any approach—including Craik’s and my 
own—that seeks to reform the regulatory review process without a corresponding 
devolution of the Crown’s discretionary powers to First Nations will be resisted 
by many First Nations who claim jurisdiction over the impacted areas. They 
maintain that unless the process of consultation is directed towards a restructuring 
of sovereign jurisdictions wherein Aboriginal peoples exercise their own collective 
control over their lands and resources, peripheral attempts to effect reconciliation 
through EA have little chance of success.111
109. Craik, supra note 14 at 678-79.
110. One should always bear in mind, that at the end of the day, any discretionary decision about 
project approval in the face of uncertain risk will entail an irreducibly normative judgment 
regarding what level of risk is acceptable. Conflicting tolerances for risk between affected 
Indigenous communities and government agendas, with respect to resource development, 
will thus be a frequent and central point of contention. See Part IV, below, for extended 
discussion on this point.
111. See e.g. Gordon Christie, “A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, 
Delgamuukw and Haida Nation” (2005) 23 Windsor YB Access Just 17; Potes, supra note 
38 at 39-40; See also E Ria Tzimas, “To What End the Dialogue?” (2011), 54 SCLR 
493 at 514-518.
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Although the SCC has cautioned that Aboriginal consent may be required 
under conditions of established title,112 it has not, as noted above, gone so far 
as to suggest that consent is operative at the level of asserted claims. Therefore, 
it is important to emphasize that while I recognize that the doctrine of consultation 
is subject to serious opposition that rejects its legitimacy, it is nevertheless 
what has been judicially prescribed. My intent in the latter half of the article 
is to work within the confines of the doctrine to examine how administrative 
discretion might be structured so that the integration of the duty with the NEB 
process may be better placed to protect the constitutionally-entrenched rights of 
Indigenous Canadians.113
B. NEB ABORIGINAL CONSULTATION POLICY
Issues pertaining to Aboriginal consultation that arise under the NEB’s mandate 
are firmly situated within the administrative framework outlined in Part I(A). 
Whether acting under shared jurisdiction with the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment (CEA) Agency114 or alone as the sole regulatory authority,115 the 
NEB will conduct its own federal EA under the NEBA. The NEB asserts that its 
112. See Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 5 at para 92. Chief Justice McLachlin writes at para 92:
Once title is established, it may be necessary for the Crown to reassess prior conduct in light 
of the new reality in order to faithfully discharge its fiduciary duty to the title-holding group 
going forward. For example, if the Crown begins a project without consent prior to Aboriginal 
title being established, it may be required to cancel the project upon establishment of the title 
if continuation of the project would be unjustifiably infringing.
113. This work serves primarily as a complement, rather than an alternative to the approach 
advanced by Craik. They are similar to the extent that they both advocate for process 
constraints to be placed on the discretion of regulators; however, they differ in respect of 
the nature of the constraints. Craik directs his ideas for reform to the content of statutes 
mandating EA. My position seeks to introduce process requirements derived from the 
common law on the exercise of statutorily-conferred discretion.
114. Ibid, s 52(3). It is important to note that there is now reason to question whether regulatory 
overlap with the NEB process is restricted to other federal bodies, or may also include shared 
regulatory jurisdiction with the provinces. See Coastal First Nations v British Columbia 
(Environment), 2016 BCSC 34, 85 BCLR (5th) 360 (the court struck down a provision in an 
Equivalency Agreement between the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office and 
the NEB that permitted BC to abdicate its ultimate decision-making authority to determine 
whether to approve the Project after an environmental assessment).
115. Ibid, s 58(6).
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EA process “fully complies” with the CEAA,116 presumably including provisions 
relating specifically to Aboriginal peoples.117
Much of the NEB’s process relating to consultation is achieved through 
oversight of the proponent’s consultation protocol and project application. 
Aboriginal concerns are considered as part of the scoping phase of the 
Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment (ESA), which is submitted by 
the proponent for review by the Board. According to the NEB Filing Manual:
Where the project may impact Aboriginal communities and affect the use of 
traditional territory or potential or established treaty or Aboriginal rights, applicants 
must identify the potentially-affected Aboriginal groups and carry out effective 
consultations with them to determine their views and concerns.118
The level of detail the applicant is required to provide regarding Aboriginal 
concerns is determined by the “nature and extent of the impacts, the nature of 
the rights or interests affected and the degree of concern expressed by Aboriginal 
groups.”119 Once the proponent’s application is filed, Aboriginal groups that may 
be impacted by the project are able to participate in the NEB hearing and bring 
forward their concerns. The elements and scope of the ESA may change over 
the course of the proceedings to reflect concerns voiced during the hearing.120 
The NEB will also review the adequacy of the applicant’s proposed mitigation 
measures to address impacts on the asserted rights.
Some observers characterize the NEB’s hearing process as an effective 
means to assess project impacts on Aboriginal rights and treaty rights.121 Craik 
calls it “the central vehicle for consultation.”122 The NEB is limited, however, 
to the extent that it only considers matters that are within its jurisdiction and 
are brought forward during the course of the hearing. Matters unrelated to the 
project application will not be considered. This includes a legal determination 
regarding the existence and scope of claimed Aboriginal rights. The Board will 
consider the nature of the interests potentially impacted, but its process is “not 
tantamount to the process undertaken to determine the definitive scope of a 
right through a claims process or a court proceeding aimed at confirming the 
116. See National Energy Board, “FAQs on Environmental Assessments,” online: <www.neb-one.
gc.ca/bts/nws/fqs/nvssssmntfq-eng.html>.
117. CEAA, supra note 3, ss 4(1)(c), 5(1()(c), 19(3), 105(g).
118. See NEB Filing Manual, supra note 2 at 4A-21.
119. Ibid at 4A-22.
120. Ibid at 4A-20.
121. See Lambrecht, Aboriginal Consultation, supra note 14 at 113-14.
122. Craik, supra note 14 at 654.
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existence and parameters of an asserted Aboriginal right.”123 The Board will look 
at the claimed or established interest in the context of how it may be impacted, 
what measures can be employed to mitigate that impact and how any impact 
should be considered in light of other interests. It will then consider all of the 
benefits and costs associated with the project and balance Aboriginal concerns 
with other interests and factors before determining whether the project is in the 
public interest.124
The NEB has also committed to an “Enhanced Aboriginal Engagement 
initiative” that aims to “provide proactive contact with Aboriginal groups that 
may be affected by a proposed project that requires a public hearing.”125 The 
Initiative includes a participant funding program and “Process Advisors” who 
provide assistance to Aboriginal participants navigating the hearing process.
III. APPLYING CARRIER SEKANI TO THE NATIONAL ENERGY 
BOARD REVIEW PROCESS
A. JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND
The jurisdiction of the NEB in relation to Aboriginal rights when carrying out 
its mandate was first considered by the SCC in Quebec v Canada (National 
Energy Board).126 In that case, the Court declined to impose on the NEB a 
123. National Energy Board, National Energy Board Report - Trans Mountain Expansion Project, 
OH-001-2014 (May 2016) at 47.
124. Ibid at 48. There are compelling reasons to doubt that the NEB’s mandate to consider the 
“public interest” as an overriding concern is consistent with the approach taken by courts 
in considering issues related to section 35. See e.g. Robert Freedman & Sarah Hansen, 
“Aboriginal Rights vs The Public Interest” (Paper presented at conference held by Pacific 
Business and Law Institute, Vancouver, 26-27 February 2009), online: <www.millerthomson.
com/assets/files/article_attachments/Aboriginal_Rights_vs_The_Public_Interest .pdf>; 
Graben & Sinclair, supra note 1 at 418-21 (discussing a “dissonance in rationality” as 
regards the Board’s public interest mandate and the objectives of the courts in adjudicating 
Aboriginal rights). While it is likely true that a public interest mandate does not align 
well with consideration of Aboriginal rights as required under a section 35 analysis, the 
Court has clearly favored a balancing approach when considering asserted rights under the 
Haida doctrine.
125. See National Energy Board, “Factsheet: Engagement of and Participation by Aboriginal 
Peoples - Enhanced Aboriginal Engagement,” online: <www.neb-one.gc.ca/prtcptn/nfrmtn/
brgnlpplfs-eng.html>.
126. Quebec (Attorney General) v Canada (National Energy Board), [1994] 1 SCR 159, 112 DLR 
(4th) 129 [Quebec cited to SCR].
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fiduciary obligation to consult Aboriginal peoples.127 Despite pointed criticism,128 
this holding has also been applied in the context of the duty to consult and 
accommodate.129 Courts have been hesitant to accept any formal consultative 
role for judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals such as the NEB, since to impose 
such a duty on a tribunal would be contrary to its adjudicative independence.130 
In other words, “the imposition of that duty on tribunals would be inconsistent 
with the obligations of neutrality towards the parties to proceedings,” as one 
party would be owed a “different level of consideration than others.”131
The federal courts have consistently found the NEB process to be a sufficient 
means of discharging the duty to consult,132 going so far as to suggest that “it 
should not matter whether a problem is solved in the Board’s consultation process 
or the Crown’s Haida duty consultation process.”133 These decisions are uniform in 
finding that Crown reliance on the Board’s process does not constitute delegation 
of the Crown’s duty, but they are inconsistent with respect to the Board’s mandate 
to engage in consultation.134 .
On the issue of the NEB’s mandate to evaluate the adequacy of Crown 
consultation, the FCA has ruled that the NEB does not have jurisdiction to 
determine whether the duty to consult has been fulfilled in a private application to 
which the Crown is not a party.135 By denying leave to appeal in Standing Buffalo136 
just weeks after releasing its judgment in Carrier Sekani, the SCC seems to have 
suggested that the result in Standing Buffalo was consistent with the principles as 
delineated in Carrier Sekani, even though in Carrier Sekani, the BC government 
was the party seeking approval from the provincial utilities commission.
One should take care to recognize that the NEB often shares regulatory 
authority for assessment of a proposed pipeline. Under section 52 of the NEBA, 
the Board will only make recommendations to the Governor-in-Council (GIC), 
who is then authorized to direct the Board to issue a certificate of approval.137 
In these circumstances, a concurrent process undertaken by the CEA Agency 
127. Ibid at 184.
128. See e.g. Mullan, “Fog,” supra note 41.
129. See examples in supra note 12. But see Clyde River, supra note 13.
130. See Quebec, supra note 126 at 183-84.
131. Mullan, “Fog,” supra note 41 at 251.
132. See Brokenhead, supra note 71; Chippewas, supra note 12; Clyde River, supra note 13.
133. Ibid, Chippewas at para 63.
134. See e.g. Clyde River, supra note 13 at para 65.
135. See e.g. Standing Buffalo, supra note 12; Chippewas, supra note 12.
136. Ibid, Standing Buffalo leave to appeal to SCC refused 33482 (2 December 2010): (2010), 
413 NR 399 (note), 2010 CarswellNat 4498 (WL Can) (SCC).
137. See NEBA, supra note 3, s 54(1). See extended discussion on this point in Part IV(A), below.
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may occur, in which Aboriginal consultation is conducted in accordance with the 
spectrum analysis in Haida.138 This process runs parallel to NEB proceedings, but 
remains separate. Communication between Crown consultation coordinators and 
NEB panel members is prohibited. Both the CEA Agency and the NEB submit 
their own information with regard to consultation to the Governor-in-Council 
who then considers the adequacy of consultation before issuing the order.139
In other scenarios, however, the NEB operates as the sole regulatory 
authority and issues final decisions, for example under section 58 of the NEBA,140 
or when there is no concurrent CEA Agency consultation process under section 
52. In these cases, the extent of Crown consultation outside the NEB process 
is not well understood, nor is there any evidence that other consultation occurs 
outside of the proponent’s engagement with the affected First Nations. In this 
context, the Crown appears to rely solely on the NEB process to discharge its 
constitutional obligation.
Regardless of the regulatory context, the NEB’s process has been the subject 
of a number of recent applications for judicial review contesting the adequacy 
of consultation.141 The main issues in these applications are the extent to which 
the Crown is able to rely on the NEB’s regulatory process to discharge the duty 
to consult, and the NEB’s jurisdiction to evaluate Crown Consultation, engage 
in it, or both. What is clear from this litigation is that courts are commonly 
tasked with reviewing the exercise of administrative discretion and expertise 
that bears on Aboriginal rights. By adopting a deferential standard of review 
of the NEB’s factual findings, as prescribed by Haida Nation and Dunsmuir, 
the courts typically accord significant weight to the NEB’s determination of the 
degree of consideration due to the asserted rights of Aboriginal claimants. The 
extent to which the NEB’s process and reasons provide a sufficient basis for curial 
deference in these cases is, therefore, critically important to ensure just outcomes 
for Aboriginal claimants.
138. This was the framework applied for regulatory review of the Northern Gateway project. See 
National Energy Board & Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Considerations: 
Report of the Joint Review Panel for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project, vol 2 (Calgary: 
National Energy Board Publication Office, 2013).
139. See e.g. the operative legislative scheme in Gitxaala Nation, supra note 96 at paras 119-27.
140. See NEBA, supra note 3, s 58.
141. See e.g. Clyde River, supra note 13; Chippewas, supra note 12. The NEB also maintains an 
active web-inventory of ongoing litigation. See National Energy Board, “Court Challenges 
to National Energy Board or Governor in Council Decisions,” online: <www.neb-one.gc.ca/
pplctnflng/crt/index-eng.html>.
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The Supreme Court has recently reserved its judgement in two appeals where 
First Nations have challenged an NEB decision on the basis that the Crown’s duty 
to consult was not adequately fulfilled.142 In these cases the SCC was asked for 
the first time to apply its ruling in Carrier Sekani to the NEB’s mandate. The two 
appeals share a common thread in that the NEB was the final authorizing body 
for project approval and the only agency to provide an EA report. Aboriginal 
consultation was conducted solely through the NEB process and its screening 
of the applicants’ engagement with the affected First Nation communities. The 
appeals raise several outstanding questions, but most of them can be reduced to 
an inquiry into the NEB’s jurisdiction to evaluate the Crown’s duty to consult, 
to fulfill it, or both.
B. HAMLET OF CLYDE RIVER, ET AL V PETROLEUM GEO-SERVICES INC 
(PGS), ET AL
In Clyde River, an Inuit hamlet located on the northeast coast of Baffin Island 
contested a Geophysical Operations Authorization (GOA) issued by the NEB for 
a marine seismic survey under the terms of the Canada Oil and Gas Operations 
Act.143 This Act confers jurisdiction on the NEB to authorize the activity and 
to hear and otherwise determine all matters under the Act  “whether of law or 
of fact.” As the responsible authority under the version of the CEAA then in 
force,144 the NEB was required to complete an EA and either permit the project 
to proceed or decline to exercise its authority to permit the project. Under this 
scheme, the Board was further required to consider any effects the project might 
have on “the current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes by 
aboriginal persons.”145 Additionally, Ministerial approval or waiver of a statutorily 
required benefits plan in respect of the project was also necessary prior to NEB 
authorization.146
The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) recognizes an Inuit treaty 
right to continue hunting, fishing, and harvesting in the Nunavut settlement 
area, and to participate in decision making concerning wildlife harvesting.147 
The Clyde River community’s main concern was that the seismic testing would 
142. Clyde River, SCC, supra note 11; Chippewas, SCC, supra note 10.
143. The GOA is issued under the terms of the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, RSC 1985, 
c O-7, s5(1)(b) [COGOA].
144. See CEAA, 1992, supra note 106, ss 5(1)(d), 37(1).
145. Ibid, CEAA, ss 2(1)(b)(iii).
146. COGOA, supra note 143, s 5.2(2).
147. See Nunavut Land Claim Agreement Act, SC 1993, c 29.
(2016) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL154
harm the marine mammals that live in Baffin Bay and the Davis Strait, and thus, 
directly affect the food sources and livelihood of the Inuit.
In issuing the authorization, the NEB concluded that concerns regarding 
the project’s potential environmental effects on traditional resource use were 
addressed by the mitigation measures developed by the proponent and set out 
in the EA report.148 The principal arguments advanced by the applicant Inuit 
community in respect of inadequate consultation stem from alleged procedural 
deficiencies in the NEB’s review process. The community pointed to the Crown’s 
rejection of a request for a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and argued 
that community meetings with the proponent were not an adequate substitute for 
formal consultation.149 The main issues before the FCA were whether the Crown’s 
duty to consult with the Inuit community in respect of the project was adequately 
fulfilled and whether the NEB failed to consider Aboriginal and treaty rights.
Justice Dawson, writing for the FCA, applied Carrier Sekani and found that 
the NEB had a mandate to engage in consultation “such that the Crown may 
rely on that process to meet, at least in part, its duty to consult.”150 This finding 
appears to follow primarily from a legislative duty to consider environmental 
effects that may impact Aboriginal rights and from the principle that decisions 
must be made in accordance with section 35 of the Constitution.151 Justice Dawson 
also held that the Board’s process had afforded meaningful consultation and was 
sufficient to discharge the Crown’s duty, and that this finding was consistent with 
the line of SCC rulings that have affirmed the duty to consult may be integrated 
into robust environmental assessment and regulatory review processes.152 She also 
concluded, however, that the Crown’s reliance on the EA and RR process did not 
entail the delegation of the Crown’s duty.153 The EA and the conditions imposed 
on the GOA were found to provide reasonable accommodation of Aboriginal 
concerns.154 In addressing the specific procedural concerns of the applicants, 
the court found that since a SEA was outside the NEB’s mandate, it was not 
unreasonable to understand why one was not completed. The FCA held that the 
nature and scope of participation afforded by the Board’s process “was sufficient 
to uphold the honour of the Crown.”155
148. See Clyde River, supra note 13 at para 6.
149. Ibid at para 75.
150. Ibid at para 65.
151. Ibid at paras 51-64.
152. Ibid at para 65-69.
153. Ibid at para 46.
154. Ibid at para 100.
155. Ibid at para 92.
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It is significant that the NEB did not provide reasons for its authorization 
aside from those inferred from its EA report, which did not reference Inuit rights, 
treaty rights, or the duty to consult. In applying a standard of reasonableness to 
determine the adequacy of consultation, Justice Dawson cited Newfoundland and 
Labrador Nurses’ Union156 and concluded: “When the GOA is read in the light 
of the environmental assessment, the terms and conditions imposed upon the 
GOA and the entirety of the Board’s record, this Court is well able to understand 
why the GOA was issued.”157 Presumably, the NEB’s finding that the proponent’s 
mitigation measures and procedures meant to protect the environment were 
sufficient to negate the risk that the project would cause “significant adverse 
environmental effects” was adequate, in Justice Dawson’s view, to infer that 
explicit recognition of the Aboriginal rights at stake was not required.
The issues argued at the SCC included whether the NEB had the implied 
authority to engage in consultation under its mandate as a quasi-judicial body, 
how this implied power, if it exists, might be distinct from being delegated the 
Crown’s duty, and whether enhanced process requirements may accompany a 
mandate to consult. Also at issue was whether the Board’s regulatory process was 
sufficient—given the specific legal and factual context—to fulfill the Crown’s 
constitutional obligation. Of particular importance to the latter point will be 
an appraisal of the procedural entitlements afforded to the community by the 
NEB process—and the limited extent of Crown involvement—in light of the 
Inuit’s established treaty rights. However, it should also include a discussion 
regarding the degree to which a tribunal’s EA report can serve as the sole 
justification for project authorization without explicit acknowledgement by an 
independent statutory tribunal of the Haida requirements. Or in other words, 
whether the Board was mandated to assess the existence, scope, and adequacy of 
Crown consultation prior to authorizing the project given that it retained final 
decision-making power under the legislative scheme.
In my view, the issues in Clyde River can be framed by a more general inquiry 
into whether the constitutional nature of the duty places any formal constraints 
on the “substance”158 of a regulatory process and the subsequent decision when 
the Crown relies on that process and decision to fulfill its duty to consult, and 
when the courts review the process and decision on a deferential basis. I examine 
this issue in Part IV.
156. Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 
2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 SCR 708.
157. Clyde River, supra note 13 at para 103.
158. See Little Salmon, supra note 26 at para 39.
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C. CHIPPEWAS OF THE THAMES FIRST NATION V ENBRIDGE PIPELINES 
INC
The second case on the SCC docket was Chippewas of the Thames First Nation 
v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, in which the appellant First Nation applied for judicial 
review of an NEB decision to approve an application by Enbridge for the Line 9B 
Reversal and Capacity Expansions. Part of the project will be carried out on the 
traditional territory of the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation (COTTFN). 
The COTTFN “have Aboriginal and treaty rights in the Thames watershed, 
and assert an undetermined claim of title over the bed of the Thames River and 
its resources.”159 They argue that the proposed changes to Line 9, including the 
rate of flow and the new composition of the oil, would increase the severity of 
harm associated with any spill within their traditional territory. The COTTFN 
claimed that the NEB had no jurisdiction to issue exemptions and authorizations 
to Enbridge prior to the Crown fulfilling its duty to consult.160
In Chippewas, the NEB was acting as the final decision maker under section 
58 of the NEBA. The NEB provided the ESA report, screened the proponent’s 
engagement with affected First Nations, and held hearings at which Aboriginal 
concerns were presented. It is clear from the FCA’s judgment that the Crown did 
not engage in any form of consultation outside the Board’s regulatory process.161 
The two main issues in the case are (1) whether the NEB had jurisdiction to 
undertake the fulfillment of the Haida duty on behalf of the Crown, and (2) 
whether the NEB was required to determine whether a duty existed and whether 
the Crown had discharged that duty.
On the latter issue, Justice Ryer, writing for the majority of the FCA, 
affirmed his previous ruling in Standing Buffalo and concluded that despite its 
jurisdiction to determine questions of law arising in proceedings before it, the 
NEB had no authority, on an application to which the Crown was not a party, 
to determine whether the Crown had met its constitutional duty to consult.162 
Justice Ryer distinguished Carrier Sekani on the basis that in that case, the Crown 
was a participant to proceedings and the BCUC was able to make the factual 
159. Chippewas, supra note 12 at para 86.
160. Ibid at para 2.
161. Ibid at para 67 (in a response letter drafted by the Minister of Natural Resources, the Line 9 
NEB process is identified as one that provides a “comprehensive” venue for all affected parties 
to express their project-related concerns and interests, and that “[t]he Government relies on 
the NEB process to address potential impacts to Aboriginal and treaty rights stemming from 
projects under its mandate.”)
162. Ibid at paras 35-49.
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findings required to determine the existence and adequacy of consultation. 
Moreover, Justice Ryer indicated that if the NEB were to conclude that the 
Crown did not fulfill its Haida duty, its only recourse would be to deny the 
proponent’s application. And this, according to the majority, would be unfair to 
the proponent.163
In dissent, Justice Rennie distinguished Standing Buffalo on the basis that in 
Chippewas, the NEB was acting as a final decision maker for the project and GIC 
approval was not required. He argued that in the context of a section 58 decision, 
the majority’s reasoning would contradict existing jurisprudence, which holds 
that “[t]he duty to consult must be discharged prior to carrying out the action 
that could adversely affect the right.”164 In his view, the duty should have been 
discharged before the issuance of the order, and this could have been achieved if 
the NEB were to ask itself the questions required by Carrier Sekani, i.e., whether 
a duty to consult existed, and whether or not the Crown had discharged that 
duty.165 For the Aboriginal claimant, after-the-fact judicial review would come 
too late and, if successful, result in an “empty remedy.”166
With respect to the issue of whether the Crown’s duty had been delegated to 
the Board itself, the majority answered in the negative:
While it is within the power of Parliament to require the Board to discharge the 
Crown’s Haida duty, mandating the Board to perform such additional duties would 
require it to function outside its core areas of technical expertise. Moreover, it seems 
to me that requiring the Board to consult with First Nations on behalf of the Crown 
would make it very difficult, if not impossible, for the Board to then adjudicate – in 
its capacity as a quasi-judicial tribunal and a court of record – upon the issue of the 
adequacy of those consultations. Perhaps these observations explain why Parliament 
has not taken legislative steps to expand the jurisdiction of the Board by adding such 
additional duties.167
Although Justice Ryer did not delineate clearly what he meant by “additional 
duties,” he appeared to base his conclusion that the NEB ought not to assume 
the Crown’s duty on the Board’s apparent lack of expertise pertaining to certain 
(unspecified) issues arising from consultation. Furthermore, he suggests that if it 
were to assume this duty, the NEB would not then be able to act as an impartial 
163. Ibid at paras 46, 113.
164. Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 5 at para 78.
165. See Chippewas, supra note 12 at para 125.
166. Ibid at para 123.
167. Ibid at para 66. Justice Rennie did not dissent on this point, observing: “[i]t is a point of 
agreement between myself and the majority, and indeed between the parties, that the Board 
is incapable of actually fulfilling the duty to consult” (ibid at para 120).
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quasi-judicial body to adjudicate the adequacy of consultation. Presumably, 
in a case where the NEB’s process is relied on exclusively by the Crown to discharge 
its duty, the NEB would be asked, in effect, to adjudicate the adequacy of its own 
process. This would call into question its capacity for impartial adjudication.
The issues argued on appeal at the SCC were similar to those in Clyde River 
in respect of the Board’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the adequacy of consultation 
when acting as final decision maker, and the extent to which the Crown may 
rely exclusively on the regulatory process of an independent tribunal to fulfill 
its duty to consult. Yet, there are significant differences between the two cases. 
First, it is not in clear in Chippewas that a duty to consult was triggered, since 
the Board concluded that any impacts on the appellant’s rights would be 
minimal and appropriately mitigated.168 There was also uncertainty as to what 
the contemplated Crown conduct actually was, and whether it was sufficient to 
trigger to the duty.169
In both cases, the FCA found that the Crown had not delegated its duty to 
the NEB, and that the Crown may rely on the NEB process to discharge its duty. 
The decisions vary, however, in terms of their interpretation of the NEB’s mandate 
to engage in consultation. The SCC will need to address this inconsistency when 
it interprets the NEB’s mandate under each respective scheme.
IV. STATUTORY CONTEXT AND NEB AUTHORITY ANALYSIS
Recall that according to Carrier Sekani, a legislature may delegate to a tribunal 
one of four roles in consultation,170 and the relevant inquiry is one of legislative 
intent. In this Part, I advance two arguments related to these delegated powers. 
The first relates to the power to assess the adequacy of consultation and to 
remedy inadequate consultation. If a tribunal has been delegated this power, 
it must exercise it. I argue that the NEB’s authority to assess consultation 
adequacy is determined by the statutory context under which it is exercising its 
delegated power. In my view, the NEB does not retain a blanket power under its 
enabling legislation to evaluate the adequacy Crown consultation. Rather, it has 
168. Canada, National Energy Board, Reasons for Decision in the Matter of Enbridge Pipelines Inc., 
OH-002-2013 (Calgary: National Energy Board Publications Office, March 2014) at 97-99 
[NEB, Enbridge Reasons for Decision].
169. Justice Ryer refers to enactment of the NEBA as conduct triggering the duty. See Chippewas, 
supra note 12 at para 69. The applicants argue it was “the contemplated exercise by the Board 
of its delegated authority” to issue final approval under section 58 of the NEBA that triggered 
the duty. See ibid (Factum of the Appellant at para 54).
170. See supra Part I(A)(4).
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this power only where it has statutory authority to issue a final decision over 
project approval.171
The second argument I advance is that the NEB’s power to engage in 
consultation ought to be implied whenever it is obligated, under the operative 
legislative scheme, to be the exclusive means by which Aboriginal interests are 
taken into account. This conclusion follows from the fact the NEB’s EA report, 
which purports to evaluate the sufficiency of conditions imposed on project 
proponents to protect Aboriginal interests, is the primary justification for approval 
of a project that may adversely impact Aboriginal rights. Where no other process 
is undertaken by the Crown to assess the effects of a given project on Aboriginal 
rights, it is imperative that the process upon which the Crown relies to ensure 
that it has discharged its duty to consult complies with the constitutional nature 
of the obligation. This need not imply delegation of the duty to the NEB, but 
it requires the application of certain formal constraints to the NEB’s regulatory 
process. In particular, it requires that the NEB’s process and reasons for decision 
explicitly include an assessment of the strength of the claim that represents the 
basis of the assertion of the Aboriginal right.
A. JURISDICTION TO ASSESS CONSULTATION ADEQUACY
In an extensive empirical study of the NEB regulatory process and the duty to 
consult, Sari Graben and Abbey Sinclair argue that the approach adopted in 
Standing Buffalo should be reconsidered and tribunals be permitted to undertake 
a Haida analysis.172 The authors premise their argument on evidence that the NEB 
does not evaluate the sufficiency of consultation against any legal standard, and 
thereby “effectively does what the Crown may not: it plays a role in authorizing 
conduct that infringes rights.”173 They suggest, that “if tribunals’ findings are 
used to draw conclusions about the relative importance or unimportance of 
Aboriginal rights in any given case (which they are), then, … those findings 
must be consistent with the constitutional standards upon which Aboriginal 
peoples rely.”174
171. Others have also argued the NEB has jurisdiction to evaluate consultation adequacy if 
delegated final decision making authority. See Promislow, supra note 7; Bankes, supra note 
41; Justice Rennie’s dissent in Chippewas, supra note 12 at para 111-12. See also discussion in 
Part III(C), above.
172. See Graben & Sinclair, supra note 1.
173. Ibid at 385 [emphasis original].
174. Ibid at 385.
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I agree with the authors’ statement that tribunal findings must be aligned 
with constitutional standards, and I propose a novel argument to that effect in 
the following section. Graben and Sinclair fail, however, to differentiate between 
circumstances in which the NEB has decision-making powers and those in 
which it is charged with making recommendations. Under certain provisions 
of the NEBA,175 the NEB has final approval authority over projects that may 
adversely affect Aboriginal rights. In this context, the NEB may have implied 
power to undertake a Haida analysis and to evaluate whether Crown consultation 
has been adequate, as the authors argue. However, the role the NEB plays in 
authorizing conduct under section 52 of the NEBA does not entail a delegated 
power of decision. Rather, in these cases the NEB process is only a means by 
which the Crown can be informed with respect to a project’s potential effects on 
Aboriginal rights.
It is crucial to recognize that the Harper government’s 2012 Budget legislation 
changed the NEB’s role when issuing Certificates of Public Convenience and 
Necessity for pipelines pursuant to section 52 of the NEBA from one of issuing a 
decision to that of making a recommendation.176 Prior to the 2012 amendments, 
section 52 required the NEB to obtain GIC approval, but the GIC’s authority 
was restricted to approving or rejecting a final decision that had already been 
made by the Board. The GIC had no authority to issue any direction to the 
NEB with respect to the issuance or denial of a certificate.177 Under the amended 
legislation, it is now possible that a recommendation made by the Board to deny 
an application could be rejected by the GIC, which could order the NEB to 
175. See e.g. supra note 3, s 58.
176. The current NEBA, supra note 3, s 52(1) reads:
If the Board is of the opinion that an application for a certificate in respect of a pipeline is 
complete, it shall prepare and submit to the Minister, and make public, a report setting out
(a)  its recommendation as to whether or not the certificate should be issued for all or any 
portion of the pipeline, taking into account whether the pipeline is and will be required 
by the present and future public convenience and necessity, and the reasons for that 
recommendation; and
(b)  regardless of the recommendation that the Board makes, all the terms and conditions 
that it considers necessary or desirable in the public interest to which the certificate will 
be subject if the Governor in Council were to direct the Board to issue the certificate, 
including terms or conditions relating to when the certificate or portions or provisions of 
it are to come into force.
177. See Rowland J Harrison QC “The Elusive Goal of Regulatory Independence and the 
National Energy Board: Is Regulatory Independence Achievable? What does Regulatory 
‘Independence’ Mean? Should We Pursue It? (2013) 50:4 Alta L Rev 757 at 763.
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issue a certificate contrary to its recommendation.178 It is also possible under the 
amended NEBA for the GIC to “refer the Board’s recommendation, or any of the 
terms or conditions, set out in the report, back to the Board for reconsideration.”179 
Therefore, the GIC is able to influence the terms and conditions contained in the 
Board’s initial report through the reconsideration provision.
These amendments are a clear indication from the legislature that the 
NEB’s decision-making authority with respect to the issuance of certificates 
of approval under section 52 has been effectively removed and transferred to 
Cabinet. In the recent case Gitxaala Nation, the FCA quashed an order from 
the NEB that approved the Northern Gateway Project on the basis that Canada 
had not fulfilled its duty to consult. In so holding the FCA stated that the NEB, 
when acting pursuant to section 52, “does not really decide anything, except 
in a formal sense.”180 As one informed commentator has written, the fact that 
the NEB now makes recommendations rather than decisions with respect to 
the issuance of pipeline certificates has resulted in “a complete negation of the 
Board’s independence” from the political level of government.181
Through its EA report, the NEB still retains a critical informational and 
advisory function in respect of whether adequate consultation is taking place 
within the specific procedures it oversees.182 Nevertheless, for the purposes 
of review, the only meaningful decision maker under section 52 is the GIC. 
Although the recent Gitxaala Nation case involved a decision made by a JRP, 
the FCA’s analysis is applicable to the NEB’s own process under a section 52 
order, as the JRP was acting pursuant to the same provisions of the NEBA and 
the CEAA that would apply to the NEB if it were the only responsible authority 
under an application for project approval.183 In observing that the GIC retained 
exclusive decision-making authority over consultation matters, the court stated:
178. See NEBA, supra note 3, s 54(1).
179. Ibid, s 53(9).
180. Gitxaala Nation, supra note 96 at para 126.
181. Harrison, supra note 177 at 776.
182. For example, through evidence presented in a hearing, and its oversight of the 
proponent’s consultation.
183. Although the FCA analysis is relevant for present purposes, some commentators 
have argued the court actually applied the wrong CEAA provisions in reviewing the 
legislative scheme governing the JRP process. See Martin Olszynski, “Northern Gateway: 
Federal Court of Appeal Applies Wrong CEAA Provisions and Unwittingly Affirms 
Regressiveness of 2012 Budget Bills” (5 July 2016), online: <ablawg.ca/2016/07/05/
northern-gateway-federal-court-of-appeal-wrong-ceaa-provisions>.
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The Governor in Council’s ability to consider whether Canada has fulfilled its 
duty to consult and to impose conditions is a power necessary for the Governor 
in Council to exercise its power under sections 53 and 54 of the National Energy 
Board Act. Similarly, the activities of the coordinating Minister and other Ministers 
concerning the duty to consult are necessary matters that they can exercise in 
accordance with subsection 31(2) of the Interpretation Act.
We are fortified in this conclusion by the relationship between the Crown and the 
Governor in Council. The duty to consult is imposed upon the Crown. … the 
Governor in Council is frequently the initiator of the Crown’s exercise of executive 
authority. Given the Governor in Council’s relationship with the Crown, it stands 
to reason that that Parliament gave the Governor in Council the necessary power 
in section 54 of the National Energy Board Act to consider whether the Crown has 
fulfilled its duty to consult and, if necessary, to impose conditions.
Thus, we are satisfied that under this legislative scheme the Governor in Council, 
when considering a project under the  National Energy Board Act, must consider 
whether Canada has fulfilled its duty to consult. Further, in order to accommodate 
Aboriginal concerns as part of its duty to consult, the Governor in Council must 
necessarily have the power to impose conditions on any certificate it directs the 
National Energy Board to issue [sic].184
The GIC’s powers under sections 53 and 54 of the NEBA, and the attenuated 
power of the NEB under section 52, are sufficient, in my view, to support 
the inference that the legislature did not intend the NEB to make any legal 
determinations concerning project approval, including whether the Crown has 
discharged its duty to consult in the issuance of Certificates of Public Convenience 
and Necessity for pipelines.
As noted in Clyde River and Chippewas, there are scenarios where the NEB 
is required to complete an EA that accounts for Aboriginal concerns and where 
it retains exclusive power to issue final orders exempting certain projects from 
requiring other permits and approvals under the NEBA.185 In this context, if the 
project under review triggers the Crown’s duty to consult, I argue that the NEB 
also has the implied authority to undertake a Haida analysis and to determine 
whether Crown consultation has been adequate.
Justice Rennie’s dissent in Chippewas appears sound insofar as he emphasized 
that the NEB was the final decision maker. While the SCC in Carrier Sekani was 
silent on the issue of whether a tribunal has jurisdiction to assess consultation 
adequacy only if the Crown is a party to the proceeding, the NEB should be 
presumed to have jurisdiction over constitutional questions where it is the 
184. Gitxaala Nation, supra note 96 at paras 166-68.
185. See e.g. NEBA, supra note 3, s 58.
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final authorizing body and has authority to decide questions of law.186 Unlike 
the amended section 52, when the Board is acting pursuant to section 58, the 
legislature has not provided any indication that it intends to limit the Board’s 
jurisdiction over constitutional questions, and therefore, to consider the adequacy 
of consultation, regardless of Crown involvement.187
The real point at issue between the majority and dissent in Chippewas appears 
to be the balance struck between the procedural fairness requirements owed to 
proponents in a regulatory process that adheres to a consistent and traditional 
set of rules, and the procedures that are required to satisfy a constitutional duty 
and uphold the honour of the Crown. According to Justice Ryer, if the Crown 
does not participate in an application, it would be unfair to the proponent and 
would not “promote reconciliation” for the tribunal to delay a decision on the 
application so as to force the Crown to become a participant.188 In stark contrast, 
Justice Rennie contends that any “inconvenience to the proponent pales when 
measured against the principle[s]” that give rise to the duty.189
It will be interesting to see how the SCC resolves this issue, but since there 
is no express intent to deny the NEB the authority to address questions of law 
under the relevant provision, Justice Ryer’s concerns should not be sufficient to 
rebut the general presumption of jurisdiction over constitutional questions. The 
Board itself maintains that when making decisions under the NEBA, it exercises 
its authority “in a manner consistent with all applicable laws, including Section 
35 of the Constitution Act.”190 The Board has, for example, ruled that it has 
authority to decide constitutional questions relating to the division of powers.191 
It is also worth noting that the revised guidelines for the Ontario Energy Board 
186. See Carrier Sekani, supra note 4 at para 72. See also NEBA, ibid s 12(2), which grants the 
Board “full jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters, whether of law or of fact.” During 
the course of oral argument in the recent appeals, supra note 142, Chief Justice McLachlin 
inquired as to whether s 12 was sufficient to determine the Board’s jurisdiction over the 
Crown’s duty to consult.
187. See Chippewas, supra note 12 at para 105. Justice Rennie remarked, “[t]he duty, like the 
honour of the Crown, does not evaporate simply because a final decision has been made by a 
tribunal established by Parliament, as opposed to Cabinet.” See also Promislow, supra note 7.
188. Chippewas, ibid at paras 46, 113.
189. Ibid at para 114.
190. See ibid (Factum of the Respondent at para 49).
191. See National Energy Board, TransMountain Expansion Project, OH-001-2013, Ruling No 
40 (23 October 2014), online: <http://docs.neb-one.gc.ca> (the NEB found that bylaws 
enacted by the City of Burnaby were inoperative and inapplicable to the extent that they 
impaired TransMountain from exercising its powers under section 73(a) of the NEBA. 
Applying the doctrine of federal paramountcy, the bylaws were rendered inoperative in 
relation to TransMountain’s necessary work).
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(OEB) require the OEB to assess the adequacy of the Crown’s consultation efforts 
as part of the leave to construct hearing process.192 It is not clear why the NEB 
would not be under a similar obligation if acting as the final decision maker over 
project approval.
B. NEB MANDATE TO ENGAGE IN CONSULTATION
In my view Justice Dawson’s finding in Clyde River that the NEB had a mandate 
to engage in consultation is essentially correct. This mandate can be inferred 
from its legislative obligation to take account of Aboriginal rights and claims. 
Although the enabling legislation does not confer this power to engage in 
consultations expressly on the Board, Carrier Sekani confirms that the intent 
to grant such authority may be implied.193 The NEB’s remedial powers support 
such an implication. When acting as the final authorizing body, the NEB may 
impose whatever conditions it deems necessary to effect reasonable compromise, 
including delaying or denying project authorization if necessary. When only issuing 
recommendations, the NEB may lack authority to issue a particular remedy, but 
it has delegated powers to make findings regarding appropriate measures to be 
imposed on applicants in order to avoid or mitigate potential adverse impacts on 
Aboriginal rights. These powers play a critical role in informing the Crown in 
respect of what remedial measures may be appropriate to fulfill its duty.
Whether engaging in consultation constitutes formal delegation of the 
Crown’s duty is a question the SCC needs to resolve and will likely require 
the Court to revisit its previous ruling in Quebec, which held that the Crown’s 
fiduciary duty could not be delegated to the NEB.194 It is important to note 
that the SCC’s ruling in Quebec predates Haida Nation by approximately ten 
years. The emergence of a common law duty whose very purpose is to provide 
proactive protection for unproven or asserted Aboriginal rights claims in advance 
of decisions that may adversely affect them, may require the Court to question 
its previous ruling.
One particular area of uncertainty that was evident in oral argument for the 
appeals at the SCC, was whether the NEB, for the purposes of consultation, can 
be considered the Crown or the Crown’s agent. Although the NEB, in its role as an 
192. Ontario, Ontario Energy Board, “Revisions of the OEB Environmental Guidelines for the 
Location, Construction and Operation of Hydrocarbon Pipelines and Facilities in Ontario,” 
(11 August 2016), online: <www.ontarioenergyboard.ca/oeb/_Documents/Regulatory/
OEBltr_Guidelines_Duty_to_Consult_20160811.pdf>.
193. See Carrier Sekani, supra note 4 at para 60.
194. See Quebec, supra note 126 at 184.
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independent quasi-judicial body, may not technically be considered an “agent of 
the Crown,”195 it is nonetheless a creature of statute charged with implementing a 
government program. The SCC has ruled that a government may not establish a 
statutory regime that allows it to circumvent constitutional scrutiny,196 although 
other courts have not found this line of argument convincing. For example, 
in Neskonlith Indian Band,197 the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that 
the Crown’s duty to consult could not be delegated to a municipal council when 
issuing a development permit. Writing for the court, Justice Newbury observed 
that “local governments lack the authority to engage in the nuanced and complex 
constitutional process involving ‘facts, law, policy and compromise’” that 
consultation implies.198 She also referred to the unreasonable delay in the daily 
activities of municipal council that would result if it were required to undertake 
strength of claim assessments.199 It is significant to note the difference in context, 
however, between a municipal government being delegated a duty to consult 
First Nations in the day-to-day operations of council, and a statutory body 
being granted an explicit legislative mandate to take into account Aboriginal 
concerns as part of its regulatory process for large scale resource development. 
This difference may be one reason to question the applicability of the Neskonlith 
Indian Band ruling to the NEB.
In any event, whether or not there is some recognizable shift or transfer 
in legal responsibility is, in my view, of secondary importance to upholding 
the honour of the Crown and ensuring fulfillment of the duty in the process 
of regulatory review. The honour of the Crown dictates that some assessment 
of the strength of the asserted right must be performed prior to an action that 
could adversely affect the right in order for the Crown to fully discharge its 
constitutional obligation.200 It would, therefore, be inconsistent with the honour 
of the Crown for the legislature to establish a regime that allowed the Crown to 
misinterpret the level of consultation required.
195. See discussion in Morris Popowich, “The National Energy Board as Intermediary Between 
the Crown, Aboriginal Peoples, and Industry” (2007) 44 Alta Lev 837 at 840.
196. See Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 SCR 
307 at para 40 (a case involving consideration of section 7 Charter rights); Carrier Sekani, 
supra note 4 at para 62.
197. Neskonlith Indian Band v Salmon Arm (City), 2012 BCCA 379, 37 BCLR (5th) 49 
[Neskonlith Indian Band].
198. Ibid at para 68.
199. Ibid at para 72. Justice Newbury wrote: “Daily life would be seriously bogged down if 
consultation ‒ including the required ‘strength of claim’ assessment ‒ became necessary 
whenever a right or interest of a First Nation “might be” affected.”
200. See Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 68.
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Should engaging in consultations on which the Crown relies, without being 
delegated the Crown’s duty to consult, require the NEB to adopt constraints on 
its existing procedure? I argue that if the NEB’s EA report serves as the primary 
means by which Aboriginal rights are given due consideration in a decision for 
project approval, then the Board ought to make its findings in accordance with 
the strength of the asserted Aboriginal claims. The more subtle but important 
point is that a strength-of-claim assessment should be reconceived as not only a 
prescribed analysis that precedes and determines the depth of consultation, but 
also as a requirement that is further integrated into the EA process itself.
Recall from Part III above that the only question the NEB will ask itself 
about asserted rights is whether they are credibly asserted.201 The Board will not 
ask itself whether the asserted rights exist at law. Lambrecht argues that since the 
tribunal’s purpose is to protect Aboriginal and treaty rights as part of planning 
and controlling for project impacts, once tribunals have received evidence of the 
asserted rights, they are to assume that some or all of the asserted rights exist in 
order to assess potential impacts and the adequacy of mitigation measures.202 This 
point has led some to conclude that “the strength of claim will be assumed, rather 
than assessed at this stage of consultation.”203 While the existence of the right 
may be presumed, the degree of consideration afforded the credibly asserted right 
should vary according to the NEB’s assessment of whether the claim to the right 
was a “weakly” or “strongly” asserted claim.204 In effect, the Board is purported to 
undertake a credibility assessment relating to Aboriginal claims.
The degree of consideration the Board affords the credibly asserted right should 
translate into the imposition of a proportionate level of mitigation requirements 
on the project applicant if a probable adverse impact on the right exists.205 
A more credibly asserted right should warrant a higher degree of consideration 
and consultation than one less credibly asserted. This determination resembles 
the strength-of-claim assessment undertaken as part of the spectrum analysis, 
201. This is a very low threshold. See Carrier Sekani, supra note 4 at para 40.
202. See Lambrecht, Aboriginal Consultation, supra note 14 at 120-21. See also Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency, “Aboriginal Consultation and Environmental Assessment 
Handout,” (November 2014), online: <www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/documents/p80054/100180E.
pdf > (handout developed in relation to Roberts Bank Terminal 2 Project).
203. Craik, supra note 14 at 659.
204. Haida Nation, supra note 4 at paras 43-44.
205. It is also reasonable to suggest in light of the SCC’s language in Tsilquot’in Nation, that if 
the Aboriginal right at stake were one of title, and that right was “strongly” asserted, (i.e., 
very credible), then the Board ought to consider consent as a condition for approval. See 
Tsilquot’in Nation, supra note 5 at para 92.
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yet the NEB does not consider itself obliged to undertake a Haida analysis to 
determine the scope of consultation or to evaluate whether the proponent’s 
engagement has met that standard.
In my view, the NEB appears to be engaging in somewhat of an interpretive 
sleight of hand with respect to its EA mandate. Although one can appreciate 
that the Board’s mandate does not extend to a final legal determination of the 
scope of the claimed right, one wonders how it is possible to evade a judgment 
concerning the parameters of an asserted right, given that the Board is required 
to evaluate the sufficiency of the proposed mitigation of impact on that right. 
As tempting as it may be to believe that the Board’s expert reasoning can make 
risk determinations based solely on “the science” that would trigger the taking 
of precautions sufficient to protect Aboriginal rights, the logical structure of risk 
determinations necessitates the inclusion of non-scientific, evaluative choices. 
As professor Vern Walker has explained, “[I]nherent in the evidentiary warrant 
for the finding [of risk] are scientific uncertainties, which require decisions about 
acceptability that cannot be ‘purely scientific’.”206 The essence of the claims made 
by the appellants in both Clyde River and Chippewas was that the uncertainty 
linked to the scientific evidence (or lack thereof ) meant that the risk the projects 
presented to the claimants’ rights was unacceptable. The NEB, in each case, took 
206. See “The Myth of Science as a Neutral Arbiter for Triggering Precautions” (2003) 26 BC Int’l 
& Comp L Rev 197 at 198. See also David Lawrence, “Impact Significance Determination: 
Back to Basics” (2007) 27:8 Envtl Impact Assess Rev 755 (explaining the subjective, 
normative and value-dependent properties of significance determinations in EA); Heather 
Douglas, “Inductive Risk and Values in Science” (2000) 67 Phil of Sci 559 (noting that if 
decisions about whether to accept or reject hypotheses can have implications for practical 
action, then those decisions about acceptance should depend in part on non-epistemic 
value judgments about the cost of error); Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual & Wendy Wagner, 
“Understanding Environmental Models in their Legal and Regulatory Context” (2010) 
22:2 J Envtl L 251 (noting that while environmental models govern much of what is 
understood as legitimate regulatory action, they are contingent on numerous policy-relevant 
assumptions and framing decisions); Brian H MacGillivray, “Heuristics Structure and 
Pervade Formal Risk Assessment” (2014) 34:4 Risk Analysis 771 (observing that the 
methods and conclusions drawn from risk assessment are highly sensitive to the choices of 
individual analysts).
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the opposite view.207 But judgments about evidentiary sufficiency are, in both 
law and science, subjective, value-laden decisions.208 The difference between 
the claimants’ and the NEB’s positions does not reflect a disagreement over an 
objective set of facts, but rather, an expression of conflicting tolerances for risk. 
I submit that the practical consequence of this for an EA that takes into account 
Aboriginal concerns, where a non-trivial degree of scientific uncertainty is 
typically the rule and not the exception, is that a claimant’s risk tolerance should 
be afforded more or less weight in the Board’s decision-making process depending 
on the strength of the claim and the nature of the right in question, and that this 
factor should be communicated in a meaningful and transparent way through 
the NEB’s reasons. Recall that meaningful consultation, as defined by Newman, 
requires discussion of the uncertainty of the scope of the claimed rights in advance 
of a decision that may adversely affect them. Arguably, by determining the 
sufficiency of imposed conditions and mitigation requirements without reference 
207. As Graben & Sinclair observe, the Board’s equating of the absence or mitigation of impact(s) 
on Aboriginal rights with to an absence of “adverse effects” on Aboriginal rights is a primary 
justification it employs to avoid evaluating consultation adequacy. The NEB also tends 
to find little or no “impact” on land where it has been previously disturbed in some way, 
suggesting that the duty to consult is not triggered in these circumstances (see supra note 
1 at 413-15). See e.g. NEB, Enbridge Reasons for Decision, supra note 168. Moreover, since 
it is well recognized that the source of Aboriginal concerns is often spiritual in nature, 
wherein there is an indivisible link between individual, cultural and ecological identity 
(see e.g. John Burrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2010) at 239-248; James [Sa’ke’j] Youngblood Henderson & Jaime Battiste, “How 
Aboriginal Philosophy Informs Aboriginal Rights” in Sandra Tomsons & Lorraine Mayer, 
eds, Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: Critical Dialogues (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
2013) at 66) the Board’s exclusive reliance on biophysical markers for estimating impact 
significance very likely underestimates the degree of cultural loss and psychological harm 
affected Aboriginal communities encounter with cumulative development. See e.g. Robin 
Gregory & William Trousdale, “Compensating Aboriginal Cultural Losses: An Alternative 
Approach to Assessing Environmental Damages” (2009) 90:8 J Envtl Mgmt 2469; Sari 
Graben, “Resourceful Impacts: Harm and Valuation of the Sacred” (2014) 64:1 UTLJ 64. 
This problem is especially acute in the context of the cumulative effects of development on 
treaty rights. See e.g. Nigel Bankes, “The Implications of the Tsilhqot’in (William) and Grassy 
Narrows (Keewatin) Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada for the Natural Resources 
Industries” (2014) 33:3 J Energy Nat’l Res L 188 at 213-15.
208. Scholars of science have long discarded the conception of the scientific method as a 
“logic-machine” for generating descriptive truths from data. See e.g. Karl Popper, Conjectures 
and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1972); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: An Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge 
(London: Verso, 1978); Clifford A Hooker, Reason, Regulation and Realism: Toward a 
Naturalistic, Regulatory Systems Theory of Reason and Evolutionary Epistemology (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1995).
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to the strength of the claim to the asserted rights, the NEB is, in essence, defining 
the de facto parameters of the asserted rights in their modern form209 rather than 
merely presuming their existence, whatever such a presumption may entail.
When issuing its reports in the Clyde River and Chippewas cases, the NEB 
omitted any explicit reference to the credibility of the asserted rights or to how 
it factored their strength or nature into its decision to impose (or refrain from 
imposing) mitigating conditions on applicants.210 This omission does not imply 
that the NEB does not, at some level, factor the credibility of Aboriginal claims 
into its decisions, but rather that it does not do so in a transparent or observable 
way. If an NEB report fails to communicate to Aboriginal claimants that a 
strength-of-claim assessment has been completed, and the Crown relies on the 
NEB’s process to exhaust its duty, it stands to reason that where a significant level 
of consultation is required, the Crown has not met its Haida duty.211
Canada’s failure to share its strength-of-claim assessments with the First 
Nations concerned was a significant reason why the FCA found that the Crown 
failed to meet its duty in Gitxaala Nation. Although the majority ruled that 
Canada was not required to share its legal analyses, it was obliged to disclose 
information and discuss its assessment of Aboriginal title and rights claims with 
affected First Nations.212 The FCA further held that “it was not consistent with 
the duty to consult and the obligation of fair dealing for Canada to simply assert 
the Project’s impact would be mitigated without first discussing the nature and 
extent of the rights that were to be impacted.”213
The FCA made the above finding in Gitxaala Nation in respect of a case 
in which Canada was engaging in consultations with affected First Nations in 
a separate, yet concurrent process to the one overseen by the JRP. The NEB, 
209. Some have argued that, despite a tribunal’s limited mandate, it is effectively ruling on the 
existence and strength of Aboriginal rights or title in balancing the “benefits versus the 
costs” when issuing their recommendations to the responsible authority. See David Laidlaw, 
“Challenges in Using Aboriginal Traditional Knowledge in the Courts” (Paper delivered at 
the Environment in the Courtroom Symposium, University of Calgary, 6-7 March 2015) at 
13-14, online: <www.cirl.ca/files/cirl/david_laidlaw-en.pdf>.
210. See Graben & Sinclair, supra note 1.
211. See e.g. Louis v British Columbia (Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources), 2011 
BCSC 1070 at para 167, 338 DLR (4th) 658, aff’d 2013 BCCA 412, 49 BCLR (5th) 302 
(the BC Supreme Court found that the BC Ministry “was required to make a preliminary 
assessment of the strength of Stellat’en’s asserted claims to Aboriginal title and rights in a 
timely and transparent way so that a proper determination of the scope and content of its 
duty [could] inform the permitting process”).
212. See Gitxaala Nation, supra note 96 at para 225.
213. Ibid at para 308.
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however, is not empowered to enter bilateral consultations with affected 
Aboriginal communities outside the hearing process. This limitation likely 
precludes a one-on-one dialogue with affected First Nations regarding the 
strength of their claims. I would respond to this concern by suggesting that the 
NEB may still enter into a form of dialogue to the extent it considers claimants’ 
evidence, and provides reasons to that effect, in its EA report. That is to say, the 
Board can explain, through its report, how mitigation measures were determined 
and project approval justified (or not) in light of the strength-of-claim assessment 
it conducted with respect to affected First Nations.
Lastly, if the NEB has jurisdiction to assess the adequacy of consultation 
when acting as an independent final decision maker, does this preclude it 
from also engaging in consultation, as stated by Justice Ryer in Chippewas? 
The short answer is no, because the NEB is already assuming both roles in 
practice, although—as Graben and Sinclair make eminently clear through their 
work—the NEB is not assessing or engaging in consultation against the legal 
standard prescribed under Haida.214 Rather, the Crown and reviewing courts 
are relying on the NEB’s findings, made in accordance with its overriding 
public interest mandate, to determine whether the duty to consult has been 
satisfied.215 Consultation, understood in doctrinal terms under Haida, is not 
always equivalent to a one-on-one process of negotiation. Rather, practically 
speaking, consultation may range in one context from a simple duty of notice and 
comment, to requiring substantive acts of accommodation approaching consent 
in another. Under Taku River and Little Salmon, the regulatory process itself is 
recognized as a form of consultation, the important question being whether 
under the particular circumstances the substance of the process is sufficient to 
discharge the Crown’s duty.
The Court has yet to answer the question of whether undertaking a spectrum 
analysis would imply that the NEB was delegated the Crown’s duty. One way 
to approach the issue without deciding whether delegation of the duty occurs 
or not would be to suggest that if the NEB has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
approval process required for a project,216 or if the Crown relies on the Board’s 
process to exhaust its duty with respect to approval for a given project, then the 
214. See Graben & Sinclair, supra note 1.
215. See supra note 124 in Part II(B), above.
216. See also Nigel Bankes, “The Federal Crown Fulfilled its Consultation Obligations when the 
National Energy Board Approved a Seismic Program in Baffin Bay” (3 September 2015), 
online: <ablawg.ca/2015/09/03/the-federal-crown-fulfilled-its-consultation-obligations-
when-the-national-energy-board-approved-a-seismic-program-in-baffin-bay>.
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honour of the Crown should require either that (1) the NEB determine the scope 
and extent of consultation in accordance with Haida,217 or alternatively, that 
(2) the Board’s role in conducting an EA, which requires it to consider and 
mitigate Aboriginal concerns, should be struck from its mandate. It would then 
be open to the Crown to set up a concurrent process to undertake the EA and 
perform consultations, as it does when JRPs are established.218 How this option 
would further the rationale of regulatory efficiency, however, is difficult to see.
The point of this section is to argue that if the NEB is mandated to engage 
in consultation, it should be required to enhance its process by integrating a 
strength-of-claim assessment into its EA report. Reconciliation, in the wake of 
Haida Nation and Taku River, is now understood as “something that structures 
the process of current interaction between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples.”219 
In a way, this requires substance to cede to form, though arguably, the form 
in question is that derived from a legal standard prescribed by a constitutional 
doctrine that ought to bind administrative authority.
V. CONCLUSION: PURSUING A RECONCILIATORY 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The discharge of the duty to consult and accommodate through the administrative 
process raises complicated questions about how to ensure adequate protection for 
constitutional rights and to regulate in accordance with a public interest mandate. 
My basic thesis in this article is that if the courts accept the integration of the duty 
to consult with the process of regulatory review under the assumption that the 
constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples will be afforded adequate protection, 
then the regulatory review process ought to be tailored to constitutional 
standards. If courts will generally defer to the findings made by expert tribunals 
like the NEB about compliance with the duty to consult, it is important that 
217. If the Board retains final decision-making authority over project approval, it would also be 
required to assess the adequacy of Crown consultation. See discussion in Part IV(A), above.
218. The Trudeau government appears to have opted for an interim middle option in 
which an additional independent expert panel is established to review the NEB 
process, and in particular, whether Indigenous peoples were meaningfully consulted. 
See e.g. Chris Hall, “Trudeau government names Trans Mountain environmental 
review panel,” CBC News (17 May 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
trans-mountain-kinder-morgan-pipeline-review-panel-1.3585154>.
219. Dwight G Newman, “Reconciliation: Legal Conception(s) and Faces of Justice,” in John D 
Whyte, ed, Moving Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich, 
2008) 80 at 85.
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such tribunals give adequate weight—and provide sufficient evidence to that 
effect in their reasons—to the constitutional nature of the duty and the rights 
it serves to protect. As Tom Hickman has observed, administrative law has a 
“special value” in protecting distinct interests “indirectly through imposing 
process requirements on administrators, and it brings this established function to 
bear in the context of constitutional rights protection through the recognition of 
enhanced requirements of process.”220 In this way, administrative discretion still 
exists, but it is constrained in accordance with constitutional norms.
Reliable curial deference is difficult to achieve when complex issues of fact 
and law are further entwined with moral and legal obligations to uphold specific 
rights, given a tribunal’s overriding public interest mandate. If the reasons for 
reaching certain conclusions about impacts on Aboriginal rights include a 
clear and transparent discussion about the nature and strength of the claimed 
rights, courts (as well as affected communities and the public at large) will be 
better placed to review administrative decisions on a reasonableness standard, 
and afford (or not) a more confident basis for deference to decisions where the 
constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples may be infringed.
By itself, however, this approach can only advance the reconciliatory 
administrative project so far. Additional legislative reform may follow the SCC’s 
suggestion in Haida Nation that “[i]t is open to governments to set up regulatory 
schemes to address the procedural requirements appropriate to different problems 
at different stages, thereby strengthening the reconciliation process and reducing 
recourse to the courts.”221 If, as I have argued, the reconciliatory framework 
is going to operate in a climate of deference to administrative expertise, 
it is worth considering the option of a specialized tribunal dedicated exclusively 
to evaluating the adequacy of consultation,222 and including Indigenous members 
as adjudicators. Such a tribunal could be relied on by courts to draw on more 
than a decade of experience with the implementation of the Haida doctrine.
The SCC has decided to embed a substantial part of the reconciliation 
process in the framework of administrative law. For better or worse, the duty 
220. “Adjudicating Constitutional Rights in Administrative Law” (2016) 66:1 UTLJ 121 at 128 
[emphasis added].
221. Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 51.
222. See e.g. Mara Morellato, “Crown Consultation Policies and Practices Across Canada” (April 
2009) National Centre for First Nations Governance at 8-9, online: <fngovernance.org/
publication_docs/NCFNG_Crown_Consultation_Practices.pdf>; Knox & Isaac, supra note 
41; Bradford W Morse & Manon Lavoie, “When Should Courts Defer to Administrative 
Tribunals - The Consultation Doctrine Spectrum” (17 November 2005) at 33-37, online: 
<www.ssrn.com/abstract=880141>.
HODGSON,  PURSUING A RECONCILIATORY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 173
to consult has now been integrated to varying degrees with regulatory review of 
resource projects. Structuring the discretion of independent regulators like the 
NEB to ensure that procedures and decisions are rights-compliant is consistent 
with both administrative law principles and the underlying basis for the duty 
to consult, i.e., to uphold the honour of the Crown in recognition and respect 
of Aboriginal rights.223 In closing, it is worth noting the irony in the federal 
government’s current push to ‘modernize’ the NEB process through an emphasis 
on Indigenous engagement, which, if I am correct, requires explicit recognition 
of the rights Aboriginal peoples have held long before any statutory body was 
given the power to regulate them.
223. See Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 25.

